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Abstract
What is the Muslim conception of the Divine? To answer this question, we first must look
to the Qur’an, since Muslims consider it God’s self-revelation to human beings. However, when
we look to the Qur’an for guidance, we are presented with a God who describes Himself using
Names that indicate both His incomparability to creation (tanzīh) and His similarity (tashbīh) to
the created order. For example, God refers to Himself as the Hearing (as-Samī), the Seeing (alBaṣīr), and the Living (al-Ḥayy), but also says He is the Unique (al-Ahad). For many Muslim
scholars, these contrasts lead to paradoxes when understanding the Divine. This thesis examines
the positions of three intellectual schools on this issue, namely Kalām (Islamic dialectical
theology), Falsafah (philosophy), and Taṣawwuf (Sufism) and traces the development of their
distinct conceptions of God using the Qur’anic doctrine of the Divine Names. Through a close
study of all three approaches, we can realize how Muslims have approached these questions from
three distinct perspectives, namely through the lenses of revelation, reason, and experience.
Through a contemplation on numerous Names, and a study of the plethora of approaches to this
tradition, we are inevitably led back to the One.

3

Introduction
Belief in the oneness of God is the first article of belief in Islam, since God is “the
foundation and beginning of everything Islamic.”1 The centrality of this doctrine to Islamic thought
is clear when viewing the first pillar of faith, the Shahadah or the testimony of faith, “there is no
god but God” which is indicative of the uncompromising monotheism that is central to the Islamic
faith. Tawḥīd or attesting to the absolute oneness of God is a core doctrine in Islam, as each of the
prophets came bearing this message which both explains the nature of God and clarifies that the
only one worthy of worship is God. However, who or what is the God of Muslims like? In order
to truly worship God, it is necessary to know, some extent at least, the object of worship. If we
seek to gain knowledge of what God is like in Islam, we must look to the Qur’an for guidance,
which, as the “Speech of God” (kalām Allāh), contains His Self-revelation to His creation. Yet,
even though the Qur’an is the point of reference for information about God, it “does not
dogmatically explain what people should or should not think about God.”2 Nonetheless, as God’s
Speech and His Self-revelation to human beings, the Qur’an provides Muslims with “the full
revelation of Allāh…the Supreme Reality Whose Oneness is at the center of the Islamic message.”3
The Qur’an reveals that “God is One, at once impersonal and personal, transcendent and
immanent, majestic and beautiful, beyond all that we can conceive, and yet nearer to us than our
jugular vein.”4 Based on the teachings of the Qur’an we can also say that God is one,5 omnipotent,6

1

William C. Chittick and Sachiko Murata, The Vision of Islam (New York, Paragon House, 1994), 49.
Hamza Yusuf, The Creed of Imam al-Ṭaḥawi (Zaytuna Institute, 2007), 16.
3
Seyyed Hossein Nasr, “General Introduction” in Nasr et al, The Study Quran. 1st ed. HarperOne. 2015, xxv.
4
Nasr, xxv. Cf. Qur’an 50:16.
5
Cf. Qur’an 12:1, 39:4, and 13:16.
6
Cf. Qur’an 5:17, 59:23, 36:82, and 35:54.
2
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immanent,7 utterly transcendent,8 the Creator of the heavens and the earth,9 human beings,10 and
the only god worthy of worship.11A distinguishing feature of God’s Self-disclosure in the Qur’an
is the way in which God refers to Himself using a number of epithets, which have been called the
“ninety-nine most beautiful Names.”12 Although these Names are central to way in which God is
described in the Qur’an, the picture the Names paint of God seems to be contradictory at first,
since God refers to Himself using Names that indicate both His incomparability (tanzīh) and His
similarity (tashbīh) to the created order. The Qur’an describes a God who is utterly transcendent,
but at the same time, responsive and near. The Divine Names are thus classified under the
categories of either tanzīh (declaring incomparability) or tashbīh (affirming similarity), which
when taken together reflect tawḥīd or Divine Unity. Some Names describe God in a way that seem
to indicate God’s physical similarity to the created order such as the Hearing (as-Samī),13 the
Seeing (al-Baṣīr),14 and the Living (al-Ḥayy),15 whereas others such as: the All-Pitying (arRaʿūf),16 the Responder (al-Mujīb),17 the Loving (al-Wadūd),18 the Friend (al-Walī),19 and the
Kind (al-Laṭīf)20 indicate God’s closeness and concern for His creation. Names that indicate God’s
utter transcendence from all things include: the King (al-Malik),21 the One (al-Wahīd),22 the

7

Cf. Qur’an And We are nearer to him than his jugular vein (50:16); Wheresoever you turn, there is the Face of
God (2:115); 57:4.
8
Cf. Qur’an 42:11: Naught is like unto him.
9
Cf. Qur’an 39:46, 35:1, and 6:1.
10
Cf. Qur’an 23:12-14, 22:5, 35:11, and 40:67.
11
Cf. Qur’an 20:14: Truly I am God, there is no god but I. So worship Me; 2:255, 47:19, 37:53, 59:23.
12
See William C. Chittick, “Worship” in The Cambridge Companion to Classical Islamic Theology, edited by T.J.
Winter (Cambridge University Press, 2008), 222.
13
Cf. Qur’an 2:127, 2:137, 2:181, 2: 224.
14
Cf. Qur’an 4:58, 4:134, 17:1, 17:17.
15
Cf. Qur’an 2:55, 3:2, 20:111, 25:58.
16
Cf. Qur’an 9:117, 57:9, 59:10, 22:65.
17
Cf. Qur’an 11:61.
18
Cf. Qur’an 11:90, 85:114.
19
Cf. Qur’an 2:257, 3:68, 3:122, 4:45, 7:196, 42:48.
20
Cf. Qur’an 2:143, 2:207, 3:30, 9:117.
21
Cf. Qur’an 1:4, 59:23, 20:114.
22
Cf. Qur’an 13:6, 14:48, 38:65, 39:4.
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Unique (al-Ahad),23 the Holy (al-Quddūs),24 and the Eternal (al-Samad).25 Even though the Names
can be thought of in terms of incomparability and similarity, both tanzīh and tashbīh or Attributes
of God that we are able to comprehend, are absolved in tawḥīd, because God’s Qualities of
Distance and Nearness only reflect the One God, Allāh. Ibn ʿAṭā Allāh al-Iskandarī (1259 –1309),
an Egyptian jurist and great Sufi saint of the Shādhilī order, writes that God is “mighty despite His
nearness, and near despite His transcendence” illustrating the essential fusion of tanzīh and
tashbīh, or the junction of two opposing Attributes together into a single picture of tawḥīd.26
God describes Himself most frequently using the Names Allāh (the Arabic word
corresponding to “God”), the Compassionate (al-Raḥmān), and the Merciful (al-Raḥīm). God is
referred to as the Compassionate (al-Raḥmān), and the Merciful (al-Raḥīm) perhaps more often
than any of the other Divine Names, especially since these two Names appear at the beginning of
all but one of the 114 surahs27 (chapters) of the Qur’an in a formulation referred to as the basmalah,
which states: In the Name of God, the Compassionate, the Merciful. The basmalah is a
combination of three significant Names of God - Allāh, the Compassionate, and the Merciful –
containing God’s personal Name and two Divine Names which relate to God’s Mercy (raḥma).28
In his commentary on the Divine Names, Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazālī (1058–1111), writes that the name
Allāh is the greatest of all of the Divine Names, because it “unites all of the Attributes of
divinity.”29 Furthermore, the Name Allāh is also the most specific Name, since it can be attributed

23

Cf. Qur’an 112:1.
Cf. Qur’an 59:23, 62:1.
25
Cf. Qur’an 112:2.
26
Ibn ʿAṭā Allāh al-Iskandari, and Khalid Williams. The Pure Intention: on Knowledge of the Unique Name: AlQaṣd Al-Mujarrad fī Marifat Al-Ism Al-Mufrad. Great Shelford, Cambridge: The Islamic Texts Society, 2018, 36.
27
These two Divine Names appear at the beginning of every surah of the Qur’an, except one (Surah al-Tawbah).
28
Ibn ʿAṭā Allāh al-Iskandari, The Pure Intention: on Knowledge of the Unique Name, 18-19. For Ibn ʿAṭā Allāh alIskandarī, it is profound that the first Names that readers of the Qur’an encounter are Divine Names that indicate
God’s mercy, because this proves that God’s Mercy is of utmost importance.
29
Abu Hamid al-Ghazālī. The Ninety-Nine Beautiful Names of God: Al Maqṣad Al-Asnā Fī Sharḥ Asmā Allāh AlHusnā. Translated by David B. Burrell and Nazih B. Daher. Cambridge, U.K.: Islamic Texts Society, 1995, 51.
24
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to nothing but God. Whereas the other Divine Names refer to Attributes that are conceivable by
human beings and are found in various aspects of creation, the name Allāh cannot be shared by
creation in any way, as every other Divine Name can only be conceived of as a name of the one
supreme Name, Allāh.30 The Divine Names often appear in pairs; God calls Himself the
Compassionate (al-Raḥmān) and the Merciful (al-Raḥīm), the Living (al-Hayy) and SelfSubsisting (al-Qayyum),31 and the Beginner (al-Mubdi’) and the Restorer (al-Mu’īd).32 Other
verses list the Divine Names in succession, describing God through a multitude of different Names,
the most extensive example of which is verses 59:22-24, in which God is referred to using eighteen
different Names.33
The tradition of enumerating the Divine Names is central to Islamic practice and doctrine,
since it can be traced back to one of the sayings (ḥadīth) of the Prophet Muḥammad. The ḥadīth,
attributed to Abū Hurayrah, a notable companion (ṣaḥābah) of the Prophet and ḥadīth transmitter,
notes that the Prophet remarked, “Surely God has ninety-nine names, one hundred less one.
Whoever enumerates them will enter the Garden.”34 This call to enumerate the Divine Names has
origins in the Qur’an, which asserts, Unto God belong the Most Beautiful Names; so call Him by
them (7:180). The verb that translates to ‘call upon’ in this verse also means to invoke or supplicate,
which is why commentators on this verse took this to mean the practice of remembering God
(dhikr) and invoking Him through His Most Beautiful Names (al-asmāʾ Allah al-ḥusnā).35 Muslim

30

Al-Ghazālī, The Ninety-Nine Beautiful Names of God, 51.
Cf. Qur’an 2:255, 3:2, 20:111.
32
Cf. Qur’an 7:158, 50:23, 57:2.
33
Nasr et al., the Study Quran, 1356.
34
Aḥmad ibn Manṣūr Samʻānī. The Repose of the Spirits: a Sufi Commentary on the Divine Names. Translated by
William C. Chittick. Albany: State University of New York, 2019, lii. This is a very famous ḥadīth cited by many
canonical sources including Bukhārī and Muslim. See also: Al-Ghazālī, The Ninety-Nine Beautiful Names of God, 49.
In his treatment of the divine names, al-Ghazālī also includes the traditional list of ninety-nine mentioned by Abū
Hurayrah.
35
Nasr et. al., The Study Quran, 472.
31
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devotional practices involve a constant remembrance of God through His Names, in which God’s
Names are incorporated into various aspects of everyday life. The basmalah (the formula – “in the
Name of God, the Compassionate, the Merciful) consecrates all actions, whether it be beginning a
recitation of a new chapter of the Quran, or simple actions such as eating, drinking, entering and
leaving one’s home, since Muslims believe that every action should be performed in the Name of
God and for His sake.36 Other examples of the practical function of the Divine Names include
remembering God through His names in a methodical remembrance and the use of God’s Names
in naming others. Remembering God is a key theme in the Qur’an, as God often calls upon
believers to invoke the Name of thy Lord morning and evening (76:25), stating that it is only in the
remembrance of God that hearts are at peace (13:28). The Qur’an states that the remembrance of
God is surely greater (29:45), which mirrors the Prophetic saying, “for everything there is a polish,
and the polish of the heart is the remembrance of God.”37 Believers are urged to remember the
Name of thy Lord and devote thyself to Him with complete devotion (73:78), since only wholehearted devotion and remembrance of the Divine allows for one’s heart to become purified, by
removing the rust that covers hearts, and allowing believers to become faithful servants of God.
It is with this hope that parents often name their children in reference to the various Divine
Names. In the same way that the Prophet Muhammad was called ‘Abd-Allah (servant of God),38
Muslim parents often name their children using the formula “servant of” and a particular Divine
Name. In the hopes that their children will benefit from the blessing associated with the Divine
Name, parents often name their children, ‘Abd al-Ḥayy (servant of the Alive), ‘Abd al-Alīm
(servant of the Knower), ‘Abd al-Qādir (servant of the Powerful), ‘Abd al-Rahman (servant of the

36

Nasr et al., the Study Quran, 5.
Nasr et. al., 623.
38
Cf. Qur’an 72:19.
37
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Compassionate), ‘Abd al-Khaliq (servant of the Creator), and so on,.39 Even Islamic architecture
reflects something of the Divine Names, as mosque decoration frequently includes intricate
calligraphic representations of the Divine Names, a notable example of which is the Grand Mosque
of Kuwait which displays the ninety-nine Names in a spherical pattern on its interior dome. Islamic
oral traditions also reflect the tradition of enumerating the Divine Names, where the ninety-nine
Names are chanted in a lyrical rendition. In these ‘musical’ recitations, the reciter begins with the
longest enumeration of the Divine Names in the Qur’an: “He is God, other than whom there is no
god…the Compassionate, the Merciful…the Sovereign, the Holy, the Peace, the Faithful, the
Protector, the Mighty, the Compeller, the Proud…”40 and recites each of the names as narrated in
the Ḥadīth traditions.
Commentaries on the Divine Names
The Divine Names are also central to Islamic thought, since they are the subject of a
distinctive genre in Islamic intellectual history, that of commentaries on the Divine Names which
are lengthy contemplations on each of the Names. On the importance of the Divine Names to
Islamic thought, William Chittick writes,
for Muslim theologians and thinkers, the most beautiful Names of God designate the Attributes that
govern the cosmos and determine the nature of everything that exists. Without knowing the Names
and their significance, people will know nothing of lasting import about the world and themselves,
for the names delineate the very warp and weft of existence.41

For Chittick, the Names are considered the “roots of all that exist, since the Attributes the Names
designate, such as “life, knowledge, desire, power, making [and] form-giving” are the very Divine

39

Chittick and Murata, The Vision of Islam, 125.
This enumeration is found in verses 22-24 of Surah 59, Surah al-Hashr (The Gathering). See Nasr et. al., The
Study Quran, 1356-1357.
41
Samʻānī. The Repose of the Spirits, l.
40
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structures which permeate the entirety of existence.42 Listing the Names allows for reflection on
the Ultimate Reality, and as Chittick explains, knowledge of the world and human beings
themselves. Since the Divine Names and Attributes are the very structures which shape existence,
explaining the meanings of these Names became the subject of an important genre of theological
writings, where scholars list and explain each Name.43 These commentaries on the Divine Names
systematically try to unpack the meaning behind each one of the Names, and can be thought of as
an enumeration of the Names themselves. In this genre, scholars list each Name and try to situate
it in terms of Islamic thought. For example, a typical entry for a Divine Name in al-Ghazālī’s
commentary on the Divine Names gives a brief explanation of the Name, followed by a section
which explains the degree to which human beings can actualize this Name in their own lives. For
example, in his entry on the Name, al-Fattāḥ (“the Opener”), al-Ghazālī explains that the Opener
is “the one by whose providence whatever is closed is opened, and by whose guidance whatever
is unclear is disclosed.”44 He goes on to explain that the Opener is He who lifts veils from hearts
and opens them to the Divine mystery, and who opens kingdoms for the Prophets and delivers
them from their enemies.45 In terms of al-Ghazālī’s counsel for a person who wants to acquire the
blessing of such a Name, he writes that “man should yearn to reach a point where the locks to the
divine mysteries are opened by his speech” because such a person’s knowledge opens these doors
for him.46
Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazālī’s The Ninety-Nine Beautiful Names of God (al-Maqṣad al-asnā: fī
s̲ h̲arḥ asmāʼ Allāh al-ḥusnā), is one of the most famous commentaries on the Divine Names

42

Samʻānī, l.

43

Chittick, “Worship” in The Cambridge Companion to Classical Islamic Theology, 222.
Al-Ghazālī, The Ninety-Nine Beautiful Names of God, 79.
45
Al-Ghazālī, 79.
46
Al- Ghazālī, 79-80.
44
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tradition in Islam. Others include Aḥmad ibn Manṣūr Samʻānī’s (1094 –1140) The Repose of the
Spirits: Explaining the Names of the All-Opening King, and Abu’l-Qāsim al-Qushayrī’s (986–
1072) Explanation of God’s Most Beautiful Names. Each of these works approaches the question
of the Divine Names in different ways, building off the same prophetic tradition, however, each
one varies in the interpretation taken by the scholar on the list of names transmitted by Abū
Hurayrah.
Despite the Prophet’s mention of ninety-nine, scholars did not take this to be a numerical
limit which indicated that God must have only a certain number of names. Al-Ghazālī’s
commentary includes exactly ninety-nine Names, whereas Aḥmad Samʻānī’s includes onehundred and two names, and al-Qushayrī’s contains ninety-six.47 As Chittick notes, even if we
were to go through the Qur’an and count the Names that appear, we would not end up with ninetynine Names.48 Since God is beyond all comprehension, His Names can also be said to be infinite,
based on how we define the term ‘Name.’49 In order to make sure that they covered all ninety-nine
Names, scholars often included more than ninety-nine Names in their lists, and in his commentary
on the Divine Names, ‘Afīf al-Dīn Tilimsānī (d. 1291) derives a list of 146 Names from the
Qur’an.50 In his historical survey of the Divine Names, Les noms divins en Islam, Daniel Gimaret
compiles a list of 275 Names based on a survey of 38 different early commentaries on the Divine
Names, which indicates the diversity of Names that scholars identified.51 Later treatises on the
Divine Names that Gimaret does not cover include even more Names, revealing the lengths to
which scholars would go make sure they enumerated all of the Names of God. A notable later

47

Samʻānī, lvi.
Sam’ānī, liii.
49
Sam’ānī, lii.
50
Ibid., liii.
51
Ibid., liii.
48
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commentary, the Sharḥ al-‘asmā’ by the nineteenth century Persian philosopher Mullā Hādī
Sabziwārī (1797–1873), includes a list of 1,001 Divine Names, derived from a Shī’ite supplication
entitled al-Jawshan al-kabīr (“The Great Chainmail”).52 In chapter 558 of his al-Futūḥāt alMakkiyah (“The Meccan Revelations”) Muḥyiddin Ibn ‘Arabī (1165–1240), addresses the topic of
the Divine Names in the lengthiest treatment of the Divine Names in Islamic literature, in a
discussion that spans approximately one thousand pages.53 Furthermore, as Chittick says almost
every page of the Futūḥāt deals with the topic of the Divine Names in some way, indicating that
Ibn ‘Arabī’s survey is undoubtedly the lengthiest contemplation on the Divine Names in Islamic
intellectual history.54

Divine Names Traditions in Other Religions
As Chittick notes, “all God talk employs names and attributes.”55 Thus, discussions of the
Divine Names are not limited to Islam, rather all forms of “God talk” seek to name the Divine in
a multitude of ways. A tradition of naming the Divine can be found across religious traditions, but
the traditions of Judaism and Christianity most closely resemble the Divine Names tradition in
Islam, most likely because all three traditions share the same sacred history. As David Burrell
notes, each of the Abrahamic faiths puts a particular emphasis on the self-revelation of God
through His Divine Names in scripture (like the names Elohim, Adonai, El-Shaddai, and YHWH
in the Torah, or the Divine Names in the Qur’an), or through the incarnation of the Divine Word
(through Jesus Christ).56 In his commentary on the Name Allāh, Ibn ʿAṭā Allāh al-Iskandarī writes,

52

Ibid., liii.
Ibid., liii.
54
Ibid., liii.
55
Ibid., liii.
56
Burrell, David B. “Naming the Names of God: Muslims, Jews, Christians.” Theology Today 47 (1): 1990, 25.
53
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“know that the Most Beautiful Names number one thousand, of which there are three
hundred in the Torah, three hundred in the Gospel, three hundred in the Psalms, one in the
scriptures of Abraham, and ninety-nine in the Qur’an.”57
Although he believes that the meaning of these Names are encompassed in the Names included in
the Qur’an, his stance reflects the idea of a larger Divine Names tradition across all three
Abrahamic faiths. In the Torah, Moses asks God, “What is the name of the God of our fathers?”
and God replied: “Say this to the people of Israel: I am has sent me to you (Ex. 3:14 –15).58 In
Jewish mysticism, or Kabbalah, the Divine Names are invoked in devotional practices to acquire
some of the power or blessing associated with the different names.59 Although there is some
continuity between the Names traditions in Judaism, Christianity, and Islam, constant reiteration
and enumeration of Divine Names is common across many faiths. For example, in Hinduism, Om
is considered the most sacred formula that reflects the essence of the universe in a single syllable,
and in Hindu devotional practices, lists of 1008 or 108 names (the Sahasranāma), of certain deities
such as Vishnu, Brahma, Shakti, and Shiva are recited in order to reflect upon and praise the great
gods.
In his Summa Theologica, Thomas Aquinas (1225–1274) concludes that God is
unknowable, because even if we “may assert that God is wise or just, and mean it” we cannot claim
to “understand how God is just” because in whatever we say of God, we do not know how any of
these statements are true.60 Al-Ghazālī echoes Aquinas’ ideas when he says that knowledge about
God has to do with His Names, even if this knowledge only leads us to the conclusion that God is
unknowable.61 Thus, the exercise of invoking the Divine Names is not without merit since
57

Ibn ʿAṭā Allāh al-Iskandari, 18-19.
Burrell, “Naming the Names of God,” 22.
59
Ben-Sasson, Haim Hillel. “‘The Name of God and the Linguistic Theory of the Kabbalah’ Revisited.” The
Journal of Religion 98, no. 1 (January 2018): 3.
60
Burrell, 28. This conclusion is similar to one of the conclusions that some Islamic theologians came to when
stating that we attribute features to God without knowing how (bilā kayf) these attributes are true of God.
61
Burrell, 25.
58
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contemplating God’s Names allows us to attest to the oneness of God through the signs He reveals
in the Qur’an, and throughout all of creation. The Divine Names are meaningful in that they have
the ability to lead us back to tawḥīd, the crux of Islamic belief, and the absolute point of reference.
Tawḥīd is expressed using the shahādah, the statement which reveals that there is no god but God.
However, this statement can be taken one step further to say that there is no knowledge but God’s
Knowledge, there is no mercy but God’s Mercy, and so on, such that each Divine Name could be
viewed of using this formula. Another formula that Muslims frequently recite in their daily prayers,
Allāhu Akbar (God is greater), also reflects a similar principle, reminding us that God transcends
everything else, including our limited conceptions of Him.62 God is greater than anything we can
perceive of, so it is obvious that no one can know God but Himself.
Even if no one but God is able to know God, the Qur’an indicates that there is some
previous knowledge of the names that is essential to the progeny of Adam. The Qur’an states, And
He taught Adam the names, all of them,63 which has been interpreted by some thinkers to mean
that Adam was given knowledge of all things by virtue of being taught all of the names.64 His
descendants, however, have forgotten this knowledge, and need to return to the knowledge they
once contained, to “remember the true names of things,” and turn away from themselves in order
to turn (tawba) in repentance towards God.65 In light of this, our lifetime can be conceived of as a
single Return to God, in which we finally remember our innate nature or fiṭrah (in which we affirm
God’s oneness or tawḥīd), or the knowledge of the Names, which we have forgotten due to the
clouding of our hearts during our time in the world (dunya). In the Qur’an, God frequently calls

62

Murata and Chittick, 65.
Cf. Qur’an 2:31
64
Nasr et. al, (2:31c), 22.
65
Sam’anī, liv.
63
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upon human beings to remember Him so that He remembers them.66 Remembering God through
His many Names allows Muslims to call upon the Divine presence daily and acquire Divine
blessings daily, and actualize tawḥīd through revelation, reason, and experience.
The Qur’anic doctrine of the Divine Names is therefore central to Muslim belief and
practice, and the means of coming to know the object of worship. These Names, each of which
denote a distinct Attribute of God, serve as an excellent point from which to understand how
Muslims conceive of the God they worship. However, the numerous Names and the contrasting
views of God they posit also call into question the unity of God. When listing these Names, we are
to ask: how can God be both immanent and utterly transcendent at the same time? How could God
be both the Hearing and the Seeing, and the Unique, when human beings and other creation can
also be said to be hearing and seeing? How can we affirm the unity of God when faced with such
paradoxical descriptions? One could simply disregard these names as mere metaphor, but the
Qur’an repeatedly insists for Muslim to call upon God using them, which in itself indicates that
these Names should not be considered a mere stylistic addition to the Qur’an, but a central feature
which must be carefully examined. The Qur’an is the word of God (kalām Allāh) for Muslims, and
therefore, every verse contains exhaustive levels of meaning, such that students of Islam have
hardly exhausted interpretations of the various verses in the course of over a thousand years.
As Muslim theologians, mystics, and philosophers wrestled with the Divine Names and
their implications, they sought to reconcile the many Names into their vision of the One God, who
is both transcendent and immanent, and whose Names are infinite. Therefore, by contemplating
the many Names, we are inevitably led back to the One. This thesis examines the approaches taken
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by the three most important intellectual schools in Islam to the question of the Divine Names and
Attributes, namely the schools of Islamic theology, philosophy, and Sufism.
Chapter 1 will trace the development of Islamic theology (Kalām), the early discussions of
anthropomorphism, and the question of the reality of the Divine Names and Attributes as
approached by the theologians. This chapter builds upon the way in which groups of Muslim
theologians came to assert varied conceptions of God using the divinely revealed text as their
source. The second chapter will explain the how Islamic philosophy (falsafah) dealt with the
Divine Names and Attributes and approaching knowledge regarding the Divine. Finally, chapter
three will discuss the use of the Divine Names in the Islamic mystical tradition (Tasawwuf), in
terms of using these names in devotional practices, and the development of the theosophical
tradition within Sufism which advocates for the role of experience in gaining an understanding of
the Divine, and calls for human beings to qualify themselves through the Attributes of God.
It is important to understand that these divisions are not as rigid as they may appear, since
Kalām, Falsafah, and Tasawwuf build off each other, and are inextricably linked, and in fact deal
with the same set of ultimate questions in different ways. In fact, I argue that we can come to a
better understanding of the impact of the Divine Names through an analysis of all three methods,
since all of these means of approaching the question of the Divine Names and Attributes are simply
multiple ways of approaching the One God who is both the Beginning and the End. Although some
schools tended to emphasize Tanzīh or Tashbīh Attributes, the greatest of thinkers were those who
were able to envision how both views, incomparability and similarity, fit together. Ultimately, it
is only through a synthesis of opposites that we can understand the full Self-Disclosure of the
Divine.
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Chapter I
The Way of Revelation
Understanding the Divine Names and the Attributes they designate became central to the
theological discourse amongst Muslim scholars, who discussed shaping the right conception of
belief in God. Faced with anthropomorphic descriptions of God in the Qur’an, such as the constant
use of Divine Names such as the Hearing and the Seeing, and verses which speak of God’s Face
or His sitting on the Throne, theologians wrestled with the contrasting views of God as an absolute
transcendence (tanzīh) and a God that seems similar to the created order, in some aspects at least.
When the Qur’an says All things perish, save His face (28:88) does this mean that God has a face
like human faces? The Qur’an also states that The Compassionate mounted the Throne (20:5),
which seems to indicate that God sits on the Throne, but does this description allude to limbs? For
most theologians, this is a point of contention since the Qur’an explicitly states none is like unto
Him (112:4). Yet, what does this mention of God’s Face mean? Rationalist theologians argued that
these descriptions of God as similarity (tashbīh) are metaphor, because they cannot be reconciled
with the tanzīh descriptions of God. For most Traditionalist theologians, the mere inclusion of
these descriptions in the Qur’an means that they must be taken to be true, so God does sit on the
Throne and He does have a Face, although explaining how this is possible is beyond the scope of
human beings. Theologians mainly speak about God in terms of His Essence, which is
unknowable, and the Attributes which Name the Essence. Theological discussions about the
relationship between the Divine Essence and the Divine Attributes (or the Names) also deal with
the question of the eternality of the Attributes, and whether or not the Attributes or Divine Names
are identical with the Divine Essence. As we will see in this section, different schools of theology
took different views on these theological issues and emphasized various Divine Attributes in their

17

conception of God. Furthermore, theologians had to reconcile the many Names and contrasting
depictions of God and the Islamic principle of God’s Oneness.
This chapter traces the development of the theological tradition regarding the Divine
Names, mainly in terms of the views of rationalist and Traditionalist theologians who argued for
different conceptions of the Divine through them. Let us begin by outlining the origins of Islamic
theology to illustrate the context which inspired specific debates regarding the Divine Names and
Attributes.

I. Articulating the Core Tenets of Faith: The Development of Kalām
The first few centuries after the Prophet Muḥammad’s death in 632 CE led to the flowering
of a distinctive Islamic theological tradition, in which Muslim theologians compiled the teachings
of the Qur’an and ḥadīth in a systematic manner to expound unified systems of belief. It was the
need to engage in discourse about the principles of faith, in a complex political and social
environment, which led to the beginnings of the science of Kalām, or Islamic dialectical theology.
Kalām literally means “speech” or “word,” which for Ibn Khaldūn (1332–1406 CE) refers to the
way in which dialecticians or mutakallimūn engaged in disputation over creedal beliefs using
rational proofs.67 As Ibn Khaldūn writes, the religion which formed out of the teachings of the
Qur’an consisted of two principal duties, which he terms the “duties of the body,” and the “duties
of the heart.”68 The ‘duties of the body,’ for Ibn Khaldūn, consisted of following “the divine laws
that govern the actions of all duty-bound Muslims” from which the discipline of fiqh
(jurisprudence) emerged.69 He ascribes the origin of the duties of the heart (which he links to faith),
67
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however, to Kalām, which, he believes arose out of a necessity to affirm “by the heart…what is
spoken by the tongue,” through sustained discussion of the six articles of faith (imān) in Islam
(that is, the belief in God, His angels, His scriptures, His apostles, the Day of Judgement, and
Qadar (“the measuring out”) or predestination).70
Other seminal figures in Islamic history have alluded to the way in which the science of
the Kalām is able to establish a true understanding of the faith. Abū Ḥanīfah (699–767 CE)
famously called the Kalām, al-fiqh al-akbar (“the greater understanding”), in contradistinction to
fiqh, the “lesser understanding.”71 The Kalām has also been called usul al-din or “the roots of
religion,” because the “roots of Islam lie in faith” which leads to an “understanding [of] the nature
of things.”72 The tradition of the Kalām, however, did not begin with the Prophet, and its true shape
took place in a particular context riddled with numerous tensions. Although the early Islamic
tradition involves some discussions on matters of faith, the rational theology which we refer to as
Kalām was the first to extensively outline these articles of faith in a systematic manner in response
to certain theological questions that appeared in specific contexts.
Hamza Yusuf writes that “the Qur’an is not a book of theology, and the Prophet was not a
theologian.”73 Thus, instead of thinking about theology as something innate to religious traditions,
Yusuf urges us to conceive of theology as a reaction, a “creative response to tension in the mind
of a believer who is confronted with propositions that challenge not his experiential faith, but his
intellectual understanding of that faith.”74 Kalām, of course, deals with the intellectual
understanding of faith, which cannot necessarily replace the way in which believers experience
70
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their faith, since Kalām is a “mental activity by nature,” rather than a form of experiential
knowledge gained through ritual piety – what Yusuf calls the “spiritual witnessing of reality.75
Expressing one’s faith through language and outlining what one believes and why, however, is
incredibly important in certain situations where a clearly articulated belief system is needed in
response to external or internal challenges.
Scholars trace the historical development of the Islamic theological tradition to two factors,
the first of which is the shaping of Kalām by external influences on the growing Muslim
community, and the second is the internal fragmentation of the Muslim community following the
death of the Prophet Muḥammad.76 In terms of external influence, Islamic theology emerged in a
multi-religious environment, where Muslims often debated the principles of faith with theologians
from other traditions, many of whom were Jewish and Christian theologians equipped with
centuries of theological debates, and were well-versed in the intricacies of Hellenistic logic and
rational debate.77 The expansion of the Islamic empire in the centuries following the advent of
Islam into lands that were primarily composed of Christian, Zoroastrian, Jewish, Manichean, or
pagan communities, fostered these kinds of religious debates which required an clear articulation
of belief on the part of Muslims.78 As Muslims came into contact with such communities, they
engaged in the kinds of inter-religious debates their new neighbors had partaken in for centuries.
Yet, in order for Muslims to have sound discussions with sophisticated Jewish, Christian, and
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Hellenistic theologians, Muslims who were used to arguing the faith through revelation alone, had
to incorporate reason and logic into their arguments in order to effectively respond to their
opponents.79 Thus, the addition of reason (ʿaql) to revelation (naql) in articulating faith, was
central to the emergence of the Islamic theological tradition, since the extent to which reason could
be used to affirm revelation eventually became a point of contention in the development of Islamic
theology.80
Although the external influences certainly influenced the emergence of Islamic theology,
internal tensions regarding principles of faith took place as well. Muslims often struggled to
explain their beliefs to each other using revelation alone (naql), which itself contained differing
views on important issues, and thus easily opened up the floor for debate. As Wolfson and
Blankinship explain, the earliest traditions of Kalām included disputes over creedal differences
that arose when principles of faith were detailed.81 The questions these early theologians asked can
be summed up into two broad categories, which we will dissect throughout the course of this
chapter. These questions these early theologians asked are undoubtedly important, as they played
a key role in shaping the later debates between mutakallimūn. The first concern of the early
mutakallimūn was related to the first article of faith in Islam, that of belief in God. As Wolfson
explains, their debate was over shaping “a right conception of belief in God,” which he identifies
as a question of how to approach the topic of anthropomorphic descriptions of God in the Qur’an.82
The second concern was related to the belief in predestination and free will, or the sixth article of
faith, where the mutakallimūn wrestled with “the belief in the power of God over human acts.”83
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The first article is, of course, more pertinent to our discussion here of how Muslims
articulated their belief in God using the doctrine of the Divine Names. However, the debate over
free will and predestination became the most pressing question Muslims had to wrestle with
following the reshaping of the Muslim community after the Prophet’s death, and is therefore
responsible for shaping the budding theological tradition in countless ways. Although we cannot
go into detail here on the second concern early theologians faced, Blankinship explains that these
two concerns were initially separate, with the first concern predating the second, but the two
eventually became “symbiotically related.”84 Thus, the theological tradition blossomed alongside
the monumental changes taking place in the Muslim community, and led to the emergence of
distinct groups of mutakallimūn, each expounding clearly argued creedal arguments about the
doctrine of the Divine Names.
II. The Pre-Muʿtazilite Kalām: Early Discussions of Tashbīh verses of the Qur’an
In his study of the origins of Kalām, Wolfson identifies three distinct periods through which
we can track the development of the Kalām tradition until the introduction of the rationalistic
method of the Muʿtazilites, the school of Islamic theology which brought the question of the
Divine Names and Attributes to the center of debate.85 According to Ibn Khaldūn, the preMuʿtazilite period of Kalām arose out of a desire to reconcile the contrasting descriptions of God
in the Qur’an.86 In Khaldūn’s narration of the history of the Kalām, the addition of a “few”87
tashbīh verses in the Qur’an, which indicated God’s similarity to the likeness of human beings,
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gave rise to three views on the anthropomorphic descriptions of God.88 The first view, which he
attributes to the early Muslims, was a preference for the tanzīh verses of the Qur’an, which
affirmed God’s transcendence in every way.89 Even Muslims who emphasized tanzīh, however,
could not deny that even the anthropomorphic verses were part of the Qur’an. Their stance, instead,
was that these descriptions were the revealed word of God, but they decided it was unnecessary
“try to investigate and interpret their meaning.”90
The other two groups, however, tried to wrestle with the question of anthropomorphism,
and came to two conclusions. The first group’s method of dealing with tashbīh depictions of God
led them to profess “outright anthropomorphism,” whereas the second group attempted to
harmonize both tanzīh and tashbīh descriptions of God through an interpretation of the verses that
mention anthropomorphic Attributes.91 This group reasoned that the verses that “ascribe to God
parts of the human body” merely mean that “God is a body unlike bodies,” where names that
indicate tashbīh Attributes of God only affirm the tanzīh nature of the Divine.92 This paradoxical
formula was vehemently rejected by Ibn Khaldūn,93 who argued that such a statement “is
tantamount to saying that God is both like and not like other things,” which for him, is a blatantly
contradictory statement.94 This method of comparing “likeness,” Wolfson argues, is derived from
the fiqh tradition of qiyās (reasoning by analogy) which is then applied to the context of Kalām.95
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Based on this tradition, the pre-Muʿtazilite mutakallimūn decided that tashbīh verses of the Qur’an
did not indicate a likeness in every respect.96
In order to illustrate the framework in which questions regarding the right conception of
belief in God emerged, we have to begin first by explaining the political situation in the early
Muslim community, as this backdrop is essential to understanding where, when, and why certain
theological schools developed. The political implications of differences in belief regarding
predestination and free will began to manifest after the Prophet had passed away. With the loss of
the Prophet, Muslims struggled to name a new leader, and differed in their articulations of the
qualities of the new leader, and what the new Muslim community should look like. Most Meccans
supported a continuation of the Quraysh’s power, and thus supported Abū Bakr as the next leader
of the ummah, whereas many Medinans supported ʿAlī, and argued for a more “inclusive policy”
to govern succession, rather than forming a dynastical succession of tribesmen from the Quraysh.97
Despite the opposition, the early Muslim community at large supported Abū Bakr, and it seemed
as though this issue was put to rest during the first two caliphates of Abū Bakr (r. 632–4), and
ʿUmar (r. 634–644) who consolidated their power as leaders, and effectively ruled over a Muslim
populace not used to such a strong central authority.98 When the third caliph, ʿUthmān (r. 644–
56), was assassinated in 656 CE in a revolt that brought ʿAlī (r. 656–61) to power, the entire system
established after the death of the Prophet came crashing down, leading to a civil war (fitna).99
As Watt narrates, the first theological factor that came into contact with politics originated
in the disputes amongst the followers of ʿAlī.100 These followers were divided into two camps, the
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first of which was “deeply attached” to the leadership of ʿAlī such that they believed that a leader
of such charisma as ʿAlī was infallible.101 The second subgroup within the followers of ʿAlī
believed that ʿAlī was capable of erring, and in fact, thought he had erred because he failed to
express support for the murderers of ʿUthmān.102 This group believed that ʿUthmān had sinned
when he failed to punish a crime, and by sinning as such he had lost his authority as a leader, such
that it was not a sin, but an obligation for pious Muslims to kill him.103 The views of this group
are radical, and as such do not represent the entirety of the followers of ʿAlī, but the views of the
few members of this camp had a tremendous influence on the early theological debates, especially
in terms of the status of sinners. This radical subgroup became known as the Khārijites, or the
“Seceders,” because they seceded (kharajū) from ʿAlī when he agreed to an arbitration with
Muʿāwiya (602–680 CE) at the Battle of Siffīn (657 CE).104 In reference to the arbitration,
Khārijites proclaimed they would agree to “no decision save that of God!” (Lā hukm illā
li’Llah).105 They subsequently rebelled against ʿAlī’s authority, claiming that in arbitrating he had
committed a grave sin which expelled him from their righteous community.106 The Khārijite claim
of accepting no judgement other than God’s has been criticized for relegating the task of deciding
what God’s will is to mere human beings.107
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The early mutakallimūn also debated the sixth article of faith, the belief in predestination
(qadar), or God’s power over human acts. The differences in belief on this article of faith, are also
derived from the contrasting picture the Qur’an paints when it states that some human actions are
predetermined by God, and also alludes to the freedom humans have to choose whether to believe
or disbelieve.108 The debate over free will and predestination became the most pressing question
Muslims had to wrestle with following the reshaping of the Muslim community after the Prophet’s
death. The issue of succession carried serious political implications, and led to heated disputes
between the Muslim community, some of which can still be seen to this day.109 Although these
questions were mostly political in origin, they had resounding theological implications.110 Even
the more theological questions concerning belief in God manifested in the political sphere with
state-sponsored enforcement of doctrine. Therefore, in the discussion that follows, it may be
difficult to separate what is political and what is theological, because the two have foiled one
another for centuries, and the political enforcement of theological doctrine continually reemerges.
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In light of this entanglement of theology with politics, Watt concludes that “all theological and
philosophical ideas have a political or social reference.”111

IV. The Rise of the Muʿtazilites
The questions the Khārijites raised about the status of sinners, what a true Muslim
community should look like, and the addition of reason to revelation did not disappear, and in fact
these tensions continued to shape the Muslim conception of the Islamic community. The Khārijite
rigid belief that sin negates faith led to the fragility of their political system, with the possibility of
any leader being accused of sin, and subsequently disqualified on the grounds of illegitimacy.
Later Khārijite trends tried to moderate the early radical views by disallowing immediate
revolution against corrupt rulers, and refusing to call sinners apostates in an effort to co-exist
peacefully amongst other Muslims who did not share their views.112 In the city of Baṣra, many of
these moderate Khārijite communities existed alongside “pietists,” or groups of Muslims
concerned with living their lives in conformation with the Divine will, by carrying out actions that
God would find acceptable, and continuing to make efforts to improve their conduct.113 The most
eminent figure within these pietist circles was al-Ḥasan al-Baṣrī (642–728 CE), a companion of
ʿAlī, who criticized the Umayyads, and opposed the violent rebellion of the Khārijites.114 His
political dissent and distaste for the two extremes was based on his view of sin in terms of free
will, arguing that sinners were guilty of using predestination as a means to exculpate themselves
in the face of corruption, or claims of illegitimacy.115 Thus, he believed that sin could not be solely

111

Watt, W. Montgomery. Islamic Philosophy and Theology. Islamic Surveys: 1. University Press, 1962, 2.
Blankinship, 38.
113
Ibid., 39.
114
Ibid., 39.
115
Ibid., 39.
112

27

attributed to God, since human beings are responsible for their actions, and God creates only good,
whereas evil, in his view, comes from humans or devils.116
It was from the traditionalist circle of al-Baṣrī that the group known as the Muʿtazilites
emerged during the first part of the 8th century, and the point from which the budding Islamic
theological tradition became heavily influenced by the introduction of Hellenistic logic and debate.
As Blankinship writes, Muʿtazilism was the “first fully elaborated, quasi-rationalistic defense of
the faith,” the implications of which changed the Kalām tradition thereafter117 Early sources
narrate that the Muʿtazilites originated during one discussion in the mosque between followers of
al-Baṣrī. During the discussion, one of the followers questioned al-Baṣrī on whether a grave sinner
could be considered a Muslim, but before he could reply, one of the members of the circle, Wāṣil
ibn ʿAṭā (699–748 CE) exclaimed that the grave sinner was in an “intermediate position” between
belief and disbelief (al-manzila bayn al-manzilatayn).118 When he subsequently left the circle, alBaṣrī remarked that “he has withdrawn (i‘tazala) from us,” a phrase which coined their namesake
as the “withdrawers,” or the Muʿtazilah.119 Wāṣil’s new group propounded a theology unlike any
of the smaller strains in Islamic theology that existed prior. The Muʿtazilites offered five creedal
articles which dealt with topics such as the status of sinners, the ‘right conception’ of God, evil,
and the possibility of the beatific vision, all of which early Muslim theologians had flirted with,
but never delineated in such a rational fashion. Their doctrine had key political motives in being
“moderate” as well, in that by appealing to both Sunni and Shī’ite groups through their
‘intermediate position’ on sin, the Abbasid Caliph al-Maʾmūn (786–833 CE) hoped to acquire the
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broad support of both sections of the Muslim community.120 If the leading Sunnī view was that a
grave sinner was still a believer, and the Khārijite view was that they were an apostate, then the
Muʿtazilites stance, for al-Maʾmūn, was decidedly the best view to support.121
The first of the five points of Muʿtazilite doctrine, and the one most central to their views
on the Divine Names and Attributes, is based on their assertion of Divine Unity (tawḥīd) in a
unique way. Although most Muslims conceived of tawḥīd as attesting to the Oneness of God, the
Muʿtazilites took this to mean that nothing could share in the Divine Essence. As we have already
explained, the tradition of the ninety-nine “beautiful Names” of God (asmāʾ Allāh al-ḥusnā) in
Islam is central to Muslim practice and in shaping what Muslims believed about God. However,
early Muslim theologians focused on Names that indicate Divine Knowledge, Power, Will, Life,
Hearing, Seeing, and Speech, claiming that these Names corresponded to certain Divine Attributes
(ṣifāt).122 For the Muʿtazilites, saying that these Names indicated Attributes co-eternal with the
Divine Essence introduced multiplicity into the Divine Essence (dhāt), which must be one.
Thus, the Muʿtazilite denial of the Attributes is related to their conception of Divine Unity
(tawḥīd), in which they rationally interpreted anthropomorphic verses to maintain the single
eternity of God by explaining away the Divine Names which indicate tashbīh as mere metaphor.
The Muʿtazilites viewed references in the Qur’an to God’s “hand” to mean “power and bounty,”
“face” to mean “existence,” “descent” to mean the “descent of some of God’s signs,” and being
seated on the Throne123 to mean “dominion.”124 However, as Wolfson explains, this form of
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analogy is derived from the Aristotelian sense of analogy in that it reduces terms to mere equations,
indicating the extent of influence of Greek rationalism on Muʿtazilite thought.125 In order to
advance their total conception of Divine Unity, the Muʿtazilites broadened the meaning of tanzīh,
in a manner that absorbed any trace of tashbīh, which for the Sunni orthodoxy, made the
Muʿtazilites guilty of “divesting” (ta‘ṭil) God of His attributes.126 Regardless of opposition, the
Muʿtazilites maintained that the eternity of God meant the various Divine Names in the Qur’an
are simply Names of the Divine Essence and not Attributes that exist distinct from the Divine
Essence. If the Divine Attributes (as-ṣifāt) were separate from the Divine Essence (adh-dhāt), then
this would be problematic in light of their view of tawḥīd.
The Muʿtazilite argument against the existence of independent or hypostatic Attributes in
addition to the Divine Essence is based on two principles. The first is that they believed that
anything eternal must be a God, and the second is that the unity of God must exclude any plurality
within Him, even if those parts are tied to Him from eternity and are inseparable.127 Wāṣil ibn
ʿAtāʾs famous statement, “he who posits a thing (ma’nā) and attribute (ṣifāt) as eternal posits two
gods,” illustrates the reasons for the Muʿtazilite denial of Attributes.128 For the Muʿtazilites, if the
Divine Attributes were said to be eternal, then this would lead to multiplicity in the Divine Essence,
which fundamentally violates the Islamic principle of Divine unity. They posited that if “the
Attributes share with God in eternity” then “they would have a share in divinity (al-illahiyyah).”129
To avoid this, and preserve the Divine Unity that is central to both Islam and their doctrine, the
Muʿtazilites denied the reality of the Divine Attributes, and thought of them as mere Names of the
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Divine Essence, because the Essence, in their view, excluded any composition of parts.130 To give
a practical example, the Muʿtazilite view on an Attribute such as Knowledge, is that God knows
by Himself or His Essence, but not because of the existence of any hypostatic Attribute of
Knowledge.131 In other words, although they believed that God was the Omniscient, He was the
Omniscient without any hypostatic Attribute of Knowledge, claiming that God’s Knowledge is
identical with Him.132 As Wolfson notes, “it is because of this rigid conception of the unity of God
that they were called the “partisans of unity" (asḥab al-tawḥīd).”133
It was because of their strict belief in an absolute Divine unity, and denial of the eternity
of the Divine Attributes, that the Muʿtazilites asserted the createdness of the Qur’an, a point of
debate which had not existed prior to their arrival on the theological stage.134 This tension arose
due to a specific Attribute of God, that of His Speech, and whether or not this Attribute could be
co-eternal with God. Since the Qur’an was God’s Speech, if his Attributes were said to be eternal,
then the Qur’an would also be eternal, which would then have a share in divinity. Thus, the
Muʿtazilites decided that the Qur’an must be created to avoid any plurality in the Divine Essence.
Watt decides that it is unclear as to why the Muʿtazilites would bring up such a topic, and why
they insisted on the createdness of the Qur’an. He offers the idea that what the issue really marked
was a desire to reduce the status of the Qur’an, even as the Word of God (kalām Allāh), for political
reasons.135 Thus, the political framework surrounding even as technical a debate as this cannot be
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overlooked, since the adoption of Muʿtazilism as state doctrine in 827 CE by the caliph al-Maʾmūn,
and the subsequent inquisition (miḥna) in 833 CE which forced scholars to conform to the
Muʿtazilite teaching of the createdness of the Qur’an, illustrate the inherent political tensions
permeating such discourse.136
When this inquisition was enforced, the foremost Sunni traditionalist, Aḥmad ibn Ḥanbal
(780–855) was arrested, and subjected to torture at the hands of the new caliph, al-Muʿtaṣim (796–
842), for refusing to revoke his position of the eternity of the Qur’an.137 These events reflect the
intertwined nature of both Muʿtazilite theological positions on key issues, and the political
implications of these stances.138 For Blankinship, this is indicative of the loss of the “original
theological merits of either position on the Qur’anic text,” since these debates quickly became
overshadowed by the partisan struggles taking place alongside the critical theological reflection.139
Thus, even though Muʿtazilism remained the state doctrine until 851 CE, the brutal enforcement of
the doctrine did not convert Sunni scholars to the Muʿtazilite cause, and instead strengthened the
emerging opposition movement.140
The second of the five points of the Muʿtazilite doctrine dealt with Divine justice (‘adl),
which is why the Muʿtazilah often referred to themselves as “the people of God’s unity and justice”
(ahl al-tawḥīd wa’l-‘adl).141 Whereas the first principle was an ideological struggled backed by
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the state, the second principle of the Muʿtazilite teaching is considered to be even more central to
their system, due to its resounding implications for Muslims in this world (dunyā) and the next
(ākhirah).142 The Muʿtazilite insistence of Divine justice leads some scholars like Watt to call the
Muʿtazilites the “heirs of the Khārijites.”143 Like the Khārijites, the Muʿtazilites believed that
human beings were responsible for their own actions, but their doctrine radically emphasized the
free will of human beings at the expense of God’s. By insisting on human responsibility and human
freedom, the Muʿtazilah argued that God was constrained to be just, and thus had to reward
believers by granting them Paradise, and punish disbelievers with Hell.144 In the Muʿtazilite
conception, since God is just, He is also obligated to endow human beings with free will. If human
beings were compelled to carry out divinely ordained actions, this would make God unjust in their
view, and unable to carry out ‘the promise and the threat’ of Paradise and Hell.145 The second
principle of Muʿtazilite doctrine thus relates to the third principle, “the promise and the threat” (alwa‘d wa’-l-wa‘īd) of Paradise and Hell, a concern that follows from earlier Khārijite discussions
of the status of sinners, and good and evil. The Muʿtazilites argued that since God declared Himself
to be just, He had to “follow His own declaration,”146 such that instead of being able to merciful
to whomsoever He wills, God must punish the sinners, and must reward the righteous.147 This view
promotes the idea that God is somehow bound by His own justice, and must award punishments
and rewards in the manner the Muʿtazilites dictate. However, questions were soon raised at the
validity of such a belief. The issue of children who passed away before committing any sins rose
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to the forefront of debate, and was used as an example to criticize Muʿtazilite doctrine.148 Would
these children be granted Paradise if they had not sinned? If they were granted Paradise could this
be considered unjust, since they did not technically “merit Paradise [through] obedience”?149 If
such children were awarded ‘the promise,’ was this not unfair to others who had to earn Paradise
through good deeds?
Due to their overemphasis of the human person in shaping their own destiny, the
Muʿtazilite view was branded as “Qadarite” by those who opposed it, since it emphasized human
free will by minimizing God’s powers over human acts.150 The Muʿtazilite view of God was
considered problematic because it reinvented the relationship between human beings and God as
one where God is a “kind of cosmic justice machine, rather than a free and conscious being.”151 In
this picture, the personal deity of Muslims was stripped of His mercy and beholden to the
Muʿtazilite view of His justice.152 This view of human freedom was also taken to mean that human
beings were the creators of their own actions, which for some meant that the Muʿtazilites were
attributing acts of creation to a being other than God. The criticism goes that if the Muʿtazilites
considered the addition of the Attributes to the Essence an example of tarnishing Divine unity,
their vision of Divine Justice fell prey to doing the same, seemingly “imply[ing] partners in His
lordship,” and duly compromising the Divine Unity they so stringently wished to uphold.153
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V. The Consolidation of Sunnism and the Rise of Ashʿarism
The adoption of Muʿtazilism as state doctrine, and the subsequent inquisition (miḥna) in
833 CE prompted many influential Sunnī traditionalist scholars to actively refute Muʿtazilite
thought. During the inquisition, respected scholars of Islam, including “elderly and politically loyal
scholars” were publicly humiliated and forced to agree that the Qur’an was indeed created or face
persecution.154 The brave few who refused to comply with the state’s position on the matter were
promptly thrown in jail, where some spent the rest of their days.155 Years after the death of AlMaʾmūn in 833 CE, one of his successors, caliph al-Mutawakkil (r. 847–861 CE) brought about the
end of the fifteen year period of coercion and resistance in 848 CE,156 an action which left the once
powerful Muʿtazilites weak and unable to exercise much influence on the future of Islamic
thought, and in turn empowered the opposition movement which the inquisition aimed to brutally
oppress.157 As Josef Van Ess notes, it was ultimately the miḥna, which he describes as producing
an “immeasurable” shock, that “cost the Muʿtazilites the sympathy of all its victims, members both
of the lower classes and of the middle class.”158 Ultimately, by allying themselves with the Abbasid
court, the Muʿtazilites cut themselves off from the masses, allowing for a visible opposition
movement to take their place as the forerunners of Islamic theology.
When reviewing the end of such a traumatic inquisition, we are led to ask: why did caliph
al-Mutawakkil decide to end an inquisition which continued for many years after the death of the

forbid wrong (al-amr bi’l-ma‘rūf wa’l-nahy ‘an al-munkar), which dealt with the enforcement of the Shari’ah in the
public sphere, and thus has political implications as well. See Watt, 68.
154
Nimrod Hurvitz, “Al-Maʾmūn (r. 198/813-218/833) and the Miḥna” in The Oxford Handbook of Islamic Theology,
edited by Sabine Schmidtke (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 649.
155
Hurvitz, “Al-Maʾmūn (r. 198/813-218/833) and the Miḥna,” 649.
156
Morewedge,"Theology.”
157
W. Montgomery Watt, The Formative Period of Islamic Theology, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1973,
302.
158
Josef Van Ess, The Flowering of Islamic Theology, Harvard University Press, 2006, 5.

35

caliph who initiated it? Assessing the political situation of the time may offer some insight as to
why al-Mutawakkil decided to end the miḥna a year after assuming his role as caliph, especially if
we keep in mind the reason why al-Maʾmūn chose to adopt the Muʿtazilite position a few decades
earlier. Towards the end of the miḥna, the Muʿtazilite position which al-Maʾmūn originally
adopted in an attempt to support the intermediate position on key theological issues had ceased to
be relevant in a situation where the separation between the Sunnis and Shi’ites views had hardened
to the point where no visible compromise could bind these two strains together.159 In the face of
this realization, the government abandoned its desire to adopt the intermediate position by the
middle of the ninth century, and sided with the dominant Sunni position, an action which perhaps
was as much of a practical decision as al-Maʾmūn’s choice to support the Muʿtazilite position was.
With the government backing the orthodox Sunni position, Sunnism flourished and consolidated
over the following half century.160 In response to decreased support for Muʿtazilite doctrine,
caliphs such as al-Mutawakkil and his successors adopted a policy of “semi-rationalism” which
was conveniently situated in the middle of the spectrum, with strict Muʿtazilī rationalism at one
end, and the traditionalism of Aḥmad Ibn Ḥanbal at the other.161
Due to these changes in the political climate of the time, the Muʿtazilites had become “a
group of academic theologians who had retired to an ivory tower remote from the pressures and
tensions of the time.”162 With the adoption of a Sunni consensus on dogma by a large swathe of
the population, it became clear that a position such as that of the Muʿtazilites, which differed
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significantly from the orthodox consensus, was unlikely to gain widespread popularity and become
influential once again. Even though the Muʿtazilites had lost much of their power by the end of
the ninth century, their role in shaping classical and contemporary Islamic theology can hardly be
overstated. The Muʿtazilites transformed the nature of Kalām arguments by introducing systematic
theology to the Muslim community, since the greatest “doctrinal challenge” to the early Muslim
community came from this group of rationalist Muslim theologians whose unorthodox beliefs and
methods forced Sunni theologians to resort to similar methods in order to “produce refutations that
invariably clarified their own positions within a Sunni framework of theology.”163 Thus, it was
ultimately the miḥna which was essential in drawing out this reaction from the Sunni orthodoxy,
by sparking a movement within its ranks that aimed to effectively refute the Muʿtazilites.
Ibn Khaldūn referred to the orthodox reaction to the miḥna, as a cause for “the people of
the Sunnah to rise in defense of the articles of faith by use of intellectual (ʿaqliyyah) proofs in
order to repulse the innovations,” which produced seminal figures in early Sunni Kalām such as
Ibn Kullāb (d. c. 854 CE), al-Qalānisī,164 and al-Muḥāsibī (c. 781–857 CE).165 The Persian historian
of religions, ash-Shahrastānī (1086–1158 CE), called these three mutakallimūn some of the “most
powerful in Kalām,” due to their influence in shaping what would become a powerful Sunni
opposition.166 Ibn Kullāb, al-Qalānisī, and al-Muḥāsibī became known as the early pioneers of
Sunni Kalām who emerged out of the miḥna, in addition to the other branches of Sunni theology
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that rose to prominence during the years of the inquisition. By the middle of the ninth century, as
Wolfson explains, Muslim orthodoxy was divided into three groups, each of which responded in
various ways to Muʿtazilite doctrine, primarily in terms of their denial of the reality of the Divine
Attributes. The first of these groups was the Ḥanbalites, who denied anthropomorphism, but
accepted the literal reading of the text, while refusing to discuss the tashbīh verses of the Qur’an.167
The second group Wolfson cites is an “orthodox branch of the Ḥashwiyyah”168 who refused to
discuss verses which indicate tanzīh because they took verses that indicate tashbīh literally, and
promoted anthropomorphic readings of Qur’anic verses.169 Wolfson’s third group is what he terms
the “Kullābites,” who interpreted the anthropomorphic verses of the Qur’an using the formula “a
body unlike bodies,” which Wolfson believes they inherited from the fiqh method of analogy
(qiyās).170 It was the first and the third of these groups that played a significant role in the future
of Islamic theology, and still exist to this day; therefore, it is pertinent for us to examine both
orthodox responses in detail.
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Aḥmad Ibn Ḥanbal, the founder of the Ḥanbalite school of Islamic theology, and the
leading Sunni traditionalist of his time, was a staunch opponent of the Kalām tradition, because he
opposed any speculation regarding the tradition. He studied jurisprudence in Baghdad, and was
wholly devoted to preserving the way the “pious ancestors” or the salaf understood the traditions
of the Qur’an and ḥadīth.171 Thus, he refused to consider any later developments in thinking about
theological issues, and considered them “innovations” to the authentic creed of the early Muslim
community. As mentioned above, Ibn Ḥanbal served as the champion of orthodoxy during the
years of the miḥna, and famously refused to accept the Muʿtazilite doctrine of the createdness of
the Qur’an, which led to his imprisonment from 833 to 835 CE, where he was subjected to torture
in order to force him to agree with the caliph’s position.172 Nonetheless, he held steadfast to his
position, and was eventually released due to widespread opposition. Ibn Ḥanbal insisted that the
Qur’an was uncreated, and went one step further to argue that even the oral recitation of the Qur’an
was uncreated. This position, however, was not accepted by even some traditionalists, such as alBukhārī (810 – 870 CE) the author of one of the most authoritative ḥadīth collections, who deemed
that calling the oral recitation of the Qur’an uncreated was excessive.173
Ibn Ḥanbal’s position on theological issues was to engage in a literalist reading of the
traditions, since he believed that revelation was the only legitimate authority on matters of belief,
and he therefore prohibited the use of reason to dispute revelation, even if rational discourse was
used to verify traditionalist positions. Ibn Ḥanbal famously condemned one of the early
mutakallimūn mentioned above, al-Ḥārith al-Muḥāsibī, for using the methods of the Kalām, but
had no other points of dispute with him on matters of creed.174 Despite their doctrinal similarities,
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Ibn Ḥanbal led a boycott of al-Muḥāsibī for his “innovatory” methods, which led to his exile from
Baghdad, and the “attendance of only four people at his funeral.”175 Ibn Ḥanbal’s conservative
position on the Essence and Attribute debate was that since the Attributes are mentioned in the
Qur’an, the most one can do is affirm their existence, but go no further in explaining their meaning,
since only God can know their true meaning.176 In their defense of literal readings of the text, the
Ḥanbalites were often criticized for promoting anthropomorphism through their literal reading of
the traditions, but their desire to refute the Muʿtazilite denial of anthropomorphic verses of the
Qur’an through metaphorical interpretation (ta‘wil) led them to continually insist on the literal
meaning of the text.177 However, Traditionalists like Ibn Ḥanbal used the formula bi-lā kayf
(“without asking how”) to deflect these accusations, and explained that all descriptions of God
must be understood ‘amodally,’ or without questioning. For the Ḥanbalites, the beatific vision is
a reality, such that “the People of Paradise will see God with the eyes,” rather than a metaphorical
“seeing” as others argued178 They affirmed that God was the creator of all human acts (unlike the
Muʿtazilites who claimed that human beings create their own actions), and created in human
beings “the ability to perform each at the time of the act.”179 They held that faith lies in belief and
actions, which can increase and decrease based on the righteousness of one’s works.180 They also
countered the Muʿtazilite exaggeration of Divine justice, and the promotion of a “mechanistic”
image of God, by emphasizing the power of the immediately available, personal God that most
Muslims envisioned.181
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The third orthodox response to the miḥna shares many of the Traditionalist views, but they
used different methods, and were in fact criticized by Sunni Traditionalists like Ibn Ḥanbal for
tainting the pure creed by introducing rationalist methods.182 Since the Traditionalist school of Ibn
Ḥanbal opposed the Kalām tradition, it is the third group of Muslim theologians which Wolfson
mentions that is of particular interest to us, since Ashʿarite Kalām, which quickly became one of
the leading schools of Islamic theology about half a century later, was based on some of the ideas
first raised by this group of theologians.183 Ibn Kullāb, the founder of the Kullābite tradition, was
a Baṣran theologian who had acquired a reputation for “overwhelming his intellectual opponents,”
which is why he was nicknamed kullāb (or “grappling hook”).184 Ibn Kullāb served as a key
opponent of the Muʿtazilites, but his theological approach adopted their rationalist methods, such
that he applied the classical Baṣran Kalām methodology to “the defense and articulation of
doctrinal positions…in line with traditionalist creed.”185 By doing so, Ibn Kullāb was perhaps more
able to respond to his Muʿtazilite adversaries than other Sunnī traditionalists.186
The most influential aspect of Ibn Kullāb’s theology was his position on the relationship
between the Divine Attributes and the Divine Essence, which Bin Ramli calls the “Kullābite
formula.”187 Ibn Kullāb’s formula stated that the relationship between Attributes and Essence was
that the Attributes were “neither identical to Him nor other than Him.”188 This position emerged
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out of a desire to adequately explain the Attributes, without simply affirming the reality of the
Attributes ‘without asking how’ (bi-lā kayf), as was the position of the Sunni Traditionalists who
followed the school of Ibn Ḥanbal.189 Like other Traditionalists, Ibn Kullāb refused to explain
away the Qur’anic descriptions of God as mere metaphor or through negative theology as the
Mu’tazilites did. Where Ibn Kullāb differed, however, was in his belief that the Sunni position
could be affirmed through reasoning in the Baṣran methods of Kalām.
This shift towards explaining the Sunni Traditionalist perspective using the Baṣran
theological method did not become so influential in the time of Ibn Kullāb, but it eventually gained
traction, and paved the way for the emergence of a Sunni theological school to rival that of the
Muʿtazilah. As Harith Bin Ramli explains, Ibn Kullāb’s fame most likely was posthumous, since
during his lifetime, he did not seem to attract the attention of the miḥna; thus, it is likely that Ibn
Kullāb’s method of forging “a synthesis between traditionalist doctrine and Kalām methods
probably attracted few followers in his lifetime, only gathering pace in the following
generation.”190 This later generation of theologians succeeding Ibn Kullāb was spearheaded by alAshʿarī, who propounded the Kullābite formula once again, in a theological era that was much
more open to adopting such theological views.
Abū-’l Ḥasan al-Ashʿarī (874–935 CE) is credited with inheriting the Kullābite tradition of
utilizing a rational defense to explain the traditionalist perspective in order to rebut the
Muʿtazilites.191 Unlike Ibn Kullāb’s theology, which largely remained unnoticed during his time,
the theology of al-Ashʿarī marked a turning point in Islamic theology, since Ashʿarism became
the most prominent theological school following the decline of the Muʿtazilites, the influence of
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which can still be seen to this day.192Al-Ashʿarī was born in Baṣra, the birthplace of Muʿtazilite
theology, and studied under the leading Muʿtazilite teacher of the time, Abū ʿAlī al-Jubbāʾī (d.
915 CE).193 In 912 CE,194 al-Ashʿarī broke from his master, and renounced Muʿtazilite teachings in
favor of those of the Sunni Traditionalists.195 As we saw earlier, Al-Ashʿarī’s schism from the
Muʿtazilah reflects a growing dissatisfaction in Baṣra at the time with strict Muʿtazilī rationalism
and a turn towards Sunni Traditionalist teachings.196Although al-Ashʿarī abandoned the rationalist
teachings of the Muʿtazilah for Sunni traditionalism, he disagreed with the other Sunni orthodox
groups on the extent to which rationalism should be limited. Whereas some Traditionalists, like
Ibn Ḥanbal, “rejected rational speculation” outright, al-Ashʿarī supported “dialectical reasoning
on theological questions.”197 Yet, even though al-Ashʿarī supported rational reflection, he
maintained that revelation was the prime source of theological truths. Therefore, interestingly
enough, al-Ashʿarī was opposed by both the Muʿtazilah, who disagreed with his conclusions, and
by conservative Sunni Traditionalists who disagreed with his method of rational argumentation.198
Watt calls al-Ashʿarī’s theological position “the support of revelation by reason,” which to
some extent indicates his Muʿtazilite background and his own personal Sunni theological
leanings.199 Yet, as many readers of al-Ashʿarī have noted, it is difficult to see the way in which
he introduced a rational method, since his works consist mainly of arguments from Qur’anic verses
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and the Islamic tradition.200 Despite their outward appearance, al-Ashʿarī’s works did introduce
rational arguments into the Sunni theological tradition.201 We can see the traces of this when we
break down al-Ashʿarī’s theological positions, and note how he utilizes similar rational methods
as the Muʿtazilites, in order to explain the position of the Ḥanbalites.
Unlike the Muʿtazilah, al-Ashʿarī believed that the Qur’an was uncreated and eternal as
the Speech of God. He based his argument on the Qur’anic verse 16:40, which states, For to
anything which We have willed, We but say “Be!” and it is. If God has to say “Be!” for something
in order for it to come into existence, then a created Qur’an would have had to been generated by
this command. In other words, al-Ashʿarī argued that what the Muʿtazilites were saying was that
God would have to say “Be!” to His Speech, which is absurd, and sets off an infinite regress since
it implies that “God’s words are themselves generated by His word “Be!”202 Since both
possibilities defy reason, the Qur’an, and God’s Speech, must be uncreated and eternal.
For al-Ashʿarī, God’s Speech, like His other Attributes was eternal and distinct from His
Essence.203 Like Ibn Kullāb, al-Ashʿarī argued that if revelation refers to God’s Power,
Knowledge, Life, Will, Hearing, Sight, and Speech this must be taken to mean that these Names
indicate real “co-eternal entities that subsist in God.”204 As one can imagine, for the Muʿtazilites,
such a position was considered tantamount to affirming the existence of eternal beings other than
God, which violates the Islamic principle of Divine Oneness (tawḥīd). However, al-Ashʿarī, and
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his predecessor Ibn Kullāb, did not believe that this statement in anyway contradicts tawḥīd, since
their position was, as al-Ashʿarī stated in his creed, that the “Names of God are God.”205 This is
also the position of the Traditionalists, but Ibn Kullāb and al-Ashʿarī rejected the Ḥanbalite view
of the Attributes, and desired to rationalize the doctrinal claims of the Sunni orthodoxy on this
particular point of contention.206
Ultimately, the conclusion al-Ashʿarī came to on the question of the Attributes was to
explain the Divine Names without simply resorting to metaphorical interpretation (ta’wil) and
being guilty of divesting God’s Attributes (ta‘ṭil), or simply accepting them ‘amodally’ (that is,
bi-lā kayf) like the Traditionalists did.207 Al-Ashʿarī’s response to the Muʿtazilite rejection of the
eternity of the Attributes was to offer the same formula Ibn Kullāb had years earlier, that “God’s
eternal attributes were neither identical to, nor other than Him.”208 The Ashʿarites were questioned
about this paradoxical position, since to some extent they were arguing that God’s Attributes are
other than God, because they posited that they were not identical with the Divine Essence. Abū
Ḥāmid al-Ghazālī (1058–1111), one of the most prominent Sunni theologians, and an individual
who played a central role in the success Ashʿarism has enjoyed to this day, argues that it is a
“mistake” to say that the Attributes are other than God, since Muslims frequently refer to both the
Divine Attributes and the Divine Essence when invoking God, through invocations such as “God,
the Exalted” or the basmalah (“In the Name of God, the Compassionate, the Merciful”).209 Ghazālī
sums up the Ashʿarite position when he states,
the name of God does not designate an essence that is assumed to be devoid of the divine
attributes, just as it is not said that jurisprudence is other than the jurist…and that the
205
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carpenter’s hand is other than the carpenter. For any part of what is designated by a name
is not other than what is designated by the name.210
In the Ashʿarite view, to say that the carpenter’s hand is the carpenter is foolish, as is saying that
his hand is other than him, because a part of the carpenter is at once a part of him and also not
representative of his essence. Al-Ghazālī further explains this position by stating that, “every part
is not other the whole, nor is it the same as the whole…thus it is possible that an attribute is other
than the essence in which the attribute subsists.”211 This directly refutes the Muʿtazilite rationalist
approach that could not accept the reality of the Divine Attributes, because they believed the
Attributes had to be either the same as the Essence or other than it. Although al-Ashʿarī’s
paradoxical construction did not coincide with the Muʿtazilite logic, he countered by saying that
God Himself cannot be constrained by the bounds of logic, since He transcends everything, even
our conception of Him.212
If the Muʿtazilites were the defenders of Divine Unity and Justice, al-Ashʿarī’s chief
concern was preserving God’s Omnipotence.213 Whereas the Muʿtazilites assigned the power over
human acts to human beings themselves, al-Ashʿarī argued that saying so attributes acts of creation
to a being other than God, which compromises Divine unity. The compromise al-Ashʿarī came to
instead was the doctrine of “acquisition” (kasb), which was first offered by another one of his
Baṣran predecessors, Ḍirār ibn ʿAmr (c. 730–c.800), who, in an effort to resolve the tensions
between determinism and free will, utilized the Qur’anic doctrine of the verb kasaba (“to
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acquire”)214 to argue that human beings “acquire” their actions.215 Ḍirār’s position was that God
was ultimately the creator of all human actions, but human beings “acquire” their actions, such
that they are endowed with a certain responsibility for them.216
The doctrine of kasb thus allowed a certain degree of free will by relating human beings to
their actions, while making sure to attribute to God power over acts of creation, providing a balance
between the two extremes of advocating for predestination in order to absolve oneself of
responsibility on the one hand, and claiming that human beings are to some degree partners in
creation on the other. Like the Traditionalists, al-Ashʿarī believed that God’s Omnipotence could
not be restricted by claiming that the events of this world are not dependent on Him. Furthermore,
al-Ashʿarī argued that evil, too, comes from God, and not from human beings or devils like some
Baṣran pietists (like al-Baṣrī) argued. Since God is the Omnipotent (al-Jabbar), He must be the
creator of all that is evil, but this does not mean that evil is attributed to Him in a way that would
make Him an “evildoer.”217
Al-Ashʿarī’s positions are in many ways a compromise between the extreme rationalism
of some Muʿtazilites and the extreme conservative traditionalism of some Ḥanbalites. In an era
marked by the introduction of Hellenism, some Muslims embraced Greek thought and “committed
themselves entirely to the guidance of reason…and gave no more than lip service to [the
traditions],” and others refused the introduction of any new way of thinking into the authentic
creeds of the early Muslims.218 The way in which the first of these groups fundamentally changed
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Muslim intellectual life facilitated the rise of theologians committed to explaining Islamic dogma
through the Greek intellectual tradition. Figures like Al-Ashʿarī who were able to assimilate both
traditions without compromising on Sunni creed, allowed for a distinctive Islamic theology to
emerge. With the increasing popularity of the Ashʿarite compromise, the decline of Muʿtazilism,
and the adoption of Sunnism by caliphal authorities, Ashʿarism was set to become the leading
school of Islamic theology.
Ashʿarism enjoyed incredible success in later centuries, particularly under the patronage
of vizier Niẓām al-Mulk (1018–1092).219 However, with the rise of the Seljūq empire and their
subsequent takeover of Baghdad in 1055 CE, Ashʿarites faced persecution at the hands of the
Sultan’s vizier, al-Kundurī, a Ḥanafite who despised the “heretical” views of both the Ashʿarites,
primarily because of their adherence to the Shāfiʿī school of jurisprudence, and the Shī’ites.220
Under al-Kundurī, the Ashʿarites faced a period of public cursing during Friday communal
prayers, and were prohibited from teaching and preaching.221 With the accession of the Seljūq
Sultan, Alp-Arslān, however, a fortunate turn of events occurred for the Ashʿarites, where the new
vizier, Niẓām al-Mulk, a follower of the Ashʿarite school of theology and the Shāfi’ī school of
jurisprudence, conceived of an expansive policy to export Ashʿarite creed across the empire
through the establishment of Ashʿarite centers of learning.222 Niẓām al-Mulk reportedly took these
steps to curb the influence of the Fāṭimids and Ismaili Shi’ism in the Muslim world, by embedding
the Sunni position into the intellectual heritage through the formation of new institutions that
would propagate Ashʿarite creed and Shāfi’ite jurisprudence. Thus, towards the end of 1065 CE, a
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new college in Baghdad, the Niẓāmiyya, begun construction.223 A series of similar centers of
Ashʿarite theology were founded in other areas of the caliphate, such as Nishapur, a city in the
northeast of modern-day Iran. Niẓām al-Mulk skillfully chose some of the most distinguished
scholars of each locality for the head professorships at these universities, and it was through Niẓām
al-Mulk’s Ashʿarite program that Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazālī secured his position at the Niẓāmiyya in
Baghdad. These developments, along with the influence of al-Ghazālī’s seminal works in Kalām,
are to a large part responsible for the establishment of Ashʿarism as the Sunni orthodoxy by the
second half of the twelfth century, a status the school has upheld to this day.224

VI. Abū Mansūr al-Māturīdī and the Muslim East
Ashʿarism is not the only school which consolidated its role in Sunni orthodoxy through a
balanced approach to reason and revelation, and some Muslim scholars argue that a different
school altogether was truly able to adopt the ‘moderate position’ in both doctrine and practice. The
school of Abū Mansūr al-Māturīdī (d. 944 CE) rose to prominence in the Muslim East, especially
in Turkestan, and al-Māturīdī is often referred to as the Eastern counterpart to al-Ashʿarī.225
Historically, much about al-Māturīdī’s life has remained uncertain, since his name has been
surprisingly absent from many of the histories of the Kalām offered by historians such as Ibn
Khaldūn and Shahrastānī, who have informed much of the work on other early mutakallimūn.226
Nonetheless, this overlooked figure rose eventually became a towering intellectual, whose
teachings are taught across the Islamic world to this day. Where he was once ignored in favor of
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al-Ashʿarī, by the fourteenth century his works became central to the study of Kalām, and he was
frequently called a parallel to al-Ashʿarī, and he now serves as the founder of one of the largest
theological schools in Islam.227
The lack of knowledge about al-Māturīdī’s early life is because he was born in Māturīd, a
locality in Samarqand which was not a central region of the Islamic world at the time.228 Thus,
although he became widely popular in Samarqand and Transoxiana, for a long time his influence
was restricted to this corner of the Islamic world.229 Nonetheless, this region was not lacking in
terms of intellectual activity, since Samarqand was known for hosting a “great intellectual diversity
between the different theological and philosophical groups” that inhabited it.230 Other differences
between al-Ashʿarī and al-Māturīdī relate to their adherence to different legal schools. Whereas
Ashʿarism is associated with the Shāfi’ī school of jurisprudence, Māturīdīsm is associated with
the Ḥanafī legal tradition, founded by Abū Ḥanīfah (d. 767 CE). Within the Ḥanafī tradition, alMāturīdī was known as the “the most knowledgeable person on the views of Abū Ḥanīfah” (aʿraf
al-nās bi-madhāhib Abī Ḥanīfah),231 but this does not mean that al-Māturīdī simply followed the
teachings of Abū Ḥanīfah and the Ḥanafī theological tradition. Instead, he is known for elaborating
and “completely reforming Ḥanafī theology by defending it against the claims of various other
theological movements.”232 For Mustafa Cerić, it was al-Māturīdī’s ability to find middle ground
in the reason and dogma debate that led to his status as “one of the most original orthodox thinkers
of the early period” and “the most genuine founder of Islamic synthetic theology.”233
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One of the most important events that that gave rise to the transformation of the Ḥanafī
theological tradition by al-Māturīdī was the arrival of his main opponent, the famous Muʿtazilī
thinker Abū al-Qāsim al-Balkhī al-Kaʿbī (d. 931) in northeastern Iran.234Al-Kaʿbī was one of the
leading Muʿtazilite theologians of his time, and even al-Māturīdī acknowledged, somewhat
begrudgingly, that the Muʿtazilites considered al-Kaʿbī “the Imam of world’s inhabitants” (imām
ahl al-arḍ).235 It was the confrontation with al-Kaʿbī that led al-Māturīdī to devote his efforts to
disputing the Baghdad school of Muʿtazilite doctrine, rather than the Baṣran school al-Ashʿarī was
engaged with.236 For Rudolph, al-Māturīdī’s debates with al-Kaʿbī allowed him to “possess the
knowledge base and discursive capacity of an Iraqi mutakallim,” which, coupled with his interest
in keeping up with the latest developments in Kalām rather than replicating previous Kalām
debates, allowed him to adopt a revered status as a true theologian of the times.237
Al-Māturīdī’s theological position can be rightly called a balance between both
Muʿtazilism and Ashʿarism, a quality which becomes evident in his views on key theological
issues shared by Muslim intellectuals engaged in Kalām. If the Muʿtazilah argued that intellect
was enough to know God, and the al-Ashʿarites argued that although there were clear signs for the
existence of God, human beings were always in need of the initial “stimulus of revelation to even
become conscious of the pressing question of the existence of a Creator,” al-Māturīdī argued that
both revelation and “rational observation of the creation” brought about knowledge of God.238 In
arguing for a rational approach in interpreting revelation, al-Māturīdī’s position does not reflect a
simple concession to aspects of Muʿtazilī doctrine. Al-Māturīdī’s epistemological position is
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actually one grounded in the Ḥanafī tradition, which has generally upheld a rationalist position on
the issue of knowing God, since Abu Ḥanīfah argued that belief in God was required even without
“recourse to revelation.”239 The Ḥanafites held that no person could justify their disbelief by citing
a lack of knowledge about revelation, since other proofs (ḥujaj) for God’s existence are visible to
us, and the blessing of intellect allows us to recognize these proofs.240 Furthermore, al-Māturīdī
argues that just as we are able to know God through rational means, human beings are able
distinguish between what is good and what is bad solely by means of intellect, even without access
to revelation.241 Al-Māturīdī shares this conviction with his Ḥanafī forefather, Abū Ḥanīfah, but
this belief was entirely foreign to someone like al-Ashʿarī or other Sunni Traditionalists, who
upheld the primacy of revelation in epistemological matters.242
To the question of the Divine Attributes, al-Māturīdī devotes an entire section in his major
work on the Kalām, the Kitāb al-Tawḥīd. Based on this work, we can see that for al-Māturīdī, the
seven most important characteristics of God are His oneness, His complete otherness, His freedom
(ikhtiyār), power, will, knowledge, and creation or “existentiation” (takwīn).243 The approach alMāturīdī took to the final of these Attributes, that of “existentiation” (tawkīn) is a distinctive
feature of Māturīdite and Ḥanafite theology that is not shared by any other school of Islamic
theology.244 These schools understood the Divine Attribute of creation to be an eternal active
Attribute, since they believed God was known as the Creator before he needed to create, and was
in fact qualified by all of His Attributes eternally.245 Whereas the Ashʿarites distinguished from
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the essential and active Attributes, only the former of which they held to be eternal, the Ḥanafites
believed that all of God’s Attributes, that is all of the ways in which God refers to Himself in the
Qur’an, and His actions, are eternal and uncreated.246 Official Ḥanafite creeds such as that of alḤakīm al-Samarqandī (d. c. 953 CE) explain that the Ḥanafite view on God’s Attribute of Creation
is that,
God was always a Creator (lam yazal khāliqan) before He created the creation. His state
(ḥāl) does not change. Whoever claims that He was not a creator before the creator, but
instead became (ṣāra) a creator afterward (ba‘d), speaks like someone who claims that God
(Allāh) was not a god (ilāh) and then became God.247
Al-Māturīdī’s contribution to the debate over the Divine Attributes was a clearly articulated three
point dogma, which stated that: 1) God has Attributes which are distinct entities not identical to
the Divine Essence, 2) the Divine Attributes are distinctive from human attributes of the same
name, but they cannot be stripped of meaning through metaphorical interpretations, and 3) the
Attributes are “beginningless and eternal, whether they describe God’s essence or His actions.”248
For al-Māturīdī, the Muʿtazilite position that an Attribute, such as that of God’s Speech is
created violates the principle that nothing eternal exists but God, since saying so brings God down
“into the sphere of temporality and change.”249 In reference to the anthropomorphic descriptions
of God in the Qur’an, al-Māturīdī resorts to a central Sunni position, that of bi-lā kayf or ‘without
asking how.’ In regard to the beatific vision, al-Māturīdī argued that since theophany was the most
beautiful reward that God has promised to the people of true faith, the vision of God must be a
reality, but we must accept this amodally.250 On the subject of God sitting on the Throne, alMāturīdī decides that even though we are certain that God is not in any location or bound by spatial
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limit or scope, “one ought to still believe the Qur’an, in that He sits on the throne in some
incomprehensible way.”251 In the view of al-Māturīdī, this can be rationally understood to some
extent since our intellect tells us that God cannot be confined to any location, since He created
everything, but existed before them, and thus will always remain independent of any place.252
However, since the Qur’an says the Creator sits on the Throne, we must accept this “unshakable
fact, of which we can know nothing more precisely, because everything divine is beyond human
comprehension.”253
Where the Muʿtazilites emphasized Divine unity and justice, and the Ashʿarites stressed
Divine Omnipotence and Freedom, the central concept in al-Māturīdī’s theology was Divine
Wisdom.254Al-Māturīdī agreed with the Ashʿarites that God always acts in complete freedom, but
he further argued that God always acts in wisdom as well, since He is the “all-knowing and wise
in the absolute sense.”255 For al-Māturīdī, God’s Wisdom (ḥikmah) manifests by way of grace
(faḍl) and justice (‘adl), which allows him to explain the way in which created things ultimately
“receive their due” because all of God’s actions are wise.256 On the subject of human actions, and
the debate between predestination and free will, al-Māturīdī argued once again for a balance
between the extreme views of the Qadarites and the Jabarites, where human beings could be
granted free will, but not at the expense of God’s power over acts of creation. Al-Māturīdī decides
that God creates (khalq) actions and human beings do them (fiʿl), a stance which endows human
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beings with responsibility over their actions because of the intellect, which allows human beings
to distinguish between right and wrong actions.257
It was ultimately al-Māturīdī’s ability to form a unique synthesis between the different
strains of Islamic thought that led him to become one of the leading representatives of the Sunni
Kalām to this day, and the popularity of his works allowed him to formally enter the region of
Transoxiana in the history of the Kalām. His work utilized methods unlike any other theologian of
his times, since he avidly sought to prove what he was taught by using various methods of inquiry
to come to his positions.258 Even if he taught the same doctrines as his Ḥanafite predecessors on a
number of issues, his new method allowed him to explore the various pathways of seeking
knowledge about theological issues, and address issues that no other Ḥanafite scholar before him
had thought of. He was thus able to verify the positions of other schools on new theological
matters, to see if they could be compatible with the teachings of his own school.259 Al-Māturīdī’s
ability to find a balance between different theological concepts is clear in his concept of Divine
wisdom, which his biographers understand as the very “key to a theology of synthesis.”260 In his
view of God, al-Māturīdī was able to achieve a balance between the Traditionalist depiction of
God as “sovereign and unrestricted,” and the rationalist understanding of a just God held by the
Muʿtazilites. Al-Māturīdī upheld Divine omnipotence and freedom, but also allowed God to act in
“a comprehensible manner” because of the underlying wisdom behind every one of His actions.261

257

Ibid., 305.
Ibid., 314.
259
Ibid., 314.
260
Ibid., 317.
261
Ibid., 316-317.
258

55

VII. Relating Attribute and Essence: Conclusions on the Theological Views of the Divine
Names
Rather than simply using the methods of Kalām to attack and refute the conclusions of the
other side, al-Māturīdī used the methods of Kalām to find a doctrinal balance, what Rudolph terms
“a meeting point between the religious ideas of the Traditionalists and a type of thinking
characterized by rationality.”262 Thus, even though al-Ashʿarī and al-Māturīdī fall under the same
rubric of Sunni Kalām, the way in which they interpreted Kalām is different in each case. As a
former Muʿtazilite, al-Ashʿarī was trained in their rational form of argumentation, but he made
use of these methods to essentially explain Sunni Traditionalism.263 Like his contemporaries, alMāturīdī was undoubtedly engaged in the methods of Kalām to refute the ideas of his intellectual
opponents, but he was able to go beyond the rivalries between both groups and adopt a middle
position in doctrine using Kalām methods.
Throughout the course of this chapter, we have seen how the theological middle position
always manages to rise to prominence. At first, even Muʿtazilism, which some scholars have tried
to portray as rationalist to the point of dissociation with the Islamic tradition itself, considered
itself a balance between the Khārijite and Traditionalist Sunni position on sin and offered its
“intermediate position” on the issue, where the grave sinner was neither a believer or an apostate.
The rise of Ashʿarism allowed for the emergence of a theological school which utilized the
methods of the Muʿtazilah to propound Sunni Traditionalist teachings, and served as middle
ground between the rationalists who upheld reason and the Traditionalists who upheld revelation,
and only revelation as the source of theological truths. Al-Māturīdī’s school took the middle

262
263

Ibid., 319.
Ibid., 219.

56

position between the proposed middle positions, the Muʿtazilites and the Ashʿarites, and used their
shared methods to find a doctrinal balance between both dogma and reason.
On the issue of anthropomorphic descriptions of God, theologians wrestled with
contrasting views of God as either an absolute transcendence, which promotes an image of an
impersonal God, or relied heavily on tashbīh depictions to the point of arguing for a corporeal God
with a body, hands, and feet. To curb both extremes, Sunni Traditionalists came to the compromise
that these descriptions must be taken as a reality and accepted as God’s word, but understood
without asking how (bi-lā kayf). Rationalistic theologians could not accommodate the reality of
such descriptions and resorted to metaphorical interpretation (ta‘wil) to explain away the tashbīh
verses which did not coincide with their vision of Divine transcendence. On the famous Kalām
subject of the relationship of the Divine Attributes to the Divine Essence, and the eternality of such
Attributes, theologians took various approaches which corresponded to their view of Divine Unity.
As we saw earlier, the Muʿtazilites could not accept the reality of any co-eternal Attributes because
this was contradictory to their view of Divine unity where God alone was eternal. The Kullābites,
Ashʿarites, and other Sunni Traditionalists believed that the Attributes must be co-eternal with the
Essence but not identical with it, arguing this proof from one Attribute in particular, that of God’s
Speech, which must be eternal since the Qur’an is eternal and uncreated.
The Muʿtazilites distinguished between active and essential Attributes (ṣifāt al-fi‘l and ṣifāt
adh-dhat), or those that refer to God’s acts and those that refer to the Essence, but absolved all
Divine Attributes in the Essence, declaring that Attributes like God’s Knowledge are identical with
the Essence.264 Al-Ashʿarī and al-Māturīdī accepted this distinction but argued differently on the
eternality of Attributes. The Ashʿarites held that the active Attributes are not eternal “at least by
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implication” since “God could not be ‘creating’ (khāliq) or ‘providing’ (rāziq) until creatures
exist.”265 The Māturīdite work Sharḥ al-Fiqh al-akbar criticized this Ashʿarite doctrine for
implying a difference between the Divine Essence and Attributes and suggesting that some
Attributes are other than it, and for describing a change in his Attributes, which implies a change
in God.266 This is why al-Māturīdī and his followers claimed all of God’s Attributes to be eternal.
All of these schools accepted that God is eternal, but the question of additional eternal Attributes
became a point of contention, since, for some, an eternal Attribute implies a multiplicity of
eternals. To some extent, all argued that the Attributes are inevitably linked to God’s Essence, but
accurately defining this relationship was difficult, and led to a variety of opinions.
In our survey of the development of the various schools of theology, different schools also
emphasized different Attributes of God when compiling their doctrines. For the Muʿtazilites, it
was ultimately God’s unity and His justice which were most central to their doctrine, the Ashʿarites
stressed God’s omnipotence and freedom, and the Māturīdites saw God’s wisdom as the best
means of understanding core theological questions. These varying opinions reflect a difference in
how Muslim theologians conceived of God. Was God simply beyond all comprehension, or was it
absolutely necessary for human beings to understand His actions? Is God free to act as He wills,
or is he bound by His Attribute of justice? On the question of why certain theological schools
inclined towards an emphasis on certain Attributes rather than others, I believe these differences
reflect the sheer diversity of theological positions which arose in the shaping of the Islamic
tradition, and the varying contexts in which theologians found themselves. Although a number of
different schools have been examined in this chapter, there are endless positions that other strains
in Islamic theology took, which reflect a multiplicity of interpretations on the tradition.
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The technicality of the Essence and Attribute debate in the Islamic theological tradition
reflects a desire to understand what the numerous Names and descriptions used in the Qur’an to
describe God actually mean. Do the Qur’anic mentions of God’s “hands” or God’s “throne”
indicate that there is a certain anthropomorphism to the literal reading of the text, and if so, how
do we understand these in light of other Qur’anic descriptions of God which stress his dissimilarity
from all of creation? These questions stumped theologians who worked to take these many Names,
and contrasting depictions and reconcile them with the Islamic principle of God’s oneness. The
different approaches taken are incredibly diverse, but reflect a pious effort to understand both the
revelation, and the nature of the source of this revelation as He describes Himself.
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CHAPTER 2
THE WAY OF REASON
As we discussed previously, Muslim theologians often utilized different tools to expound
their views on various points of belief. The earliest mutakallimūn utilized methods derived from
the science of fiqh such as qiyās (reasoning through analogy), whereas later theologians, inspired
by Hellenistic logic and debate used rational discourse to either verify Traditionalist positions (as
the Ash’arites and Māturīdites did), or propose ‘unorthodox’ interpretations of revelation based on
their rationalist perspective (like the Muʿtazilites). The prevailing schools of Sunnī Islamic
theology in the formative period, which still wield influence to this day, were those that took the
middle position on this issue, and were able to argue for Traditionalist positions using the
rationalistic means first introduced by Muslim theologians who were influenced by the Greek
philosophical tradition. Thus, in any overview of the Islamic theological tradition, it is impossible
to ignore the impact of Greek philosophy on the early mutakallimūn, since the threat posed by the
rationalistic Muʿtazilites was what prompted Sunnī Traditionalist theologians to work to
comprehend and utilize the former’s methods. In order to better understand Kalām, we must turn
our attention toward another major Islamic intellectual tradition, that of philosophy or falsafah,
which blossomed alongside the Islamic theological tradition. Islamic philosophy both influenced
the theological tradition, and was in many ways influenced by it.
I. Falsafah: Philosophy or Theosophy?
Ziai argues that like Kalām, Islamic philosophy grew out of a desire to defend Islamic
revelation against the arguments posed by the various religious and ethnic groups which existed
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within the lands of the Islamic caliphate.267 These divergent groups engaged with Muslims in free
debate about theological issues such as God, creation, causality, free will and predestination,
debates which they had centuries of prior experience in, and skillfully argued for using Hellenistic
logic and rational debate.268 Certain members of the Muslim community thus turned to philosophy
in order to uphold tenets of Islamic faith, having seen the potential in arguing for Islam through a
rationalistic perspective, as their opponents did. These early Muslim philosophers argued that
philosophical reasoning was a better tool for such debates than qiyas, which had worked in
consolidating ḥadīth and Islamic law, but which they found was a weak tool to utilize in debates
about the ultimate questions they and their adversaries were wrestling with.269 The formative
period of Islamic philosophy contains other similarities to Kalām in that both major intellectual
schools engaged with the same questions, which were first posited by Kalām scholars.270 Thus,
even though the philosophers took care to distinguish philosophy from theology, the problems that
formed the nucleus of philosophical activity were first brought to attention by the early theological
debates.271 Yet, even though philosophy and theology engaged with the same set of ultimate
questions, unlike Kalām, philosophy enjoyed a marginal status in Islamic scholastic activity, and
was opposed by many Traditionalist jurists for its overtly rationalistic tendencies.272
In the Arab world, the tradition of Islamic philosophy as an independent intellectual
perspective was overtaken by kalām and doctrinal Sufism (ma‘rifah) in areas west of Iraq after the
thirteenth century, such that the study of philosophy became marginalized in Islamic centers of
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learning.273 Nevertheless, in eastern Islamic lands such as Persia, and the general region from Iraq
to India, the study of Islamic philosophy remained vibrant, and the discipline continued for
centuries through oral transmission.274 As Nasr notes, in traditional Islamic centers of learning
such as Qom, Iran, Islamic philosophy is considered even more significant than jurisprudence, and
notably overshadows kalām in such intellectual circles.275 Thus, although some Western narratives
claim that philosophy died out entirely in Islamic lands with Ibn Rushd (1126 – 1198 CE), these
narratives fails to take into account the subsequent centuries of Islamic philosophy after him.276
The Islamic tradition of philosophy, or falsafah, is based on Arabic translations of major
works in the Greco-Alexandrian philosophical heritage which were made available to Muslims in
the 9th century.277 However, this is not to say that the Islamic philosophical tradition is simply
Greek philosophy in Arabic; instead, Muslim philosophers integrated various aspects of the Greek
tradition into the Islamic perspective, which led to the formation of distinct philosophical
schools.278 The term falsafah itself is an Arabized version of the Greek term philosōphia, which
Ziai defines as a “rational process aimed at knowing the nature of things and expressing the result
in a systematic way.”279 To describe this tradition of systematic philosophy, the term ḥikmah, or
“wisdom,” has also been used, and it was over the term ḥikmah that great debates took place, since
Sufis, philosophers, and theologians alike claimed that each of their respective discipline was the
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true science of ḥikmah.280 The Islamic philosophers argued that falsafah was synonymous to the
Qur’anic term ḥikmah since the source of all wisdom was divine.281 Thus, some scholars like
Corbin and Nasr prefer the term “theosophy” claiming it explains the more esoteric and mystical
underpinnings of the holistic Islamic philosophical systems which sought to combine various
Islamic intellectual traditions.282 As Nasr explains, although modern philosophy is often
considered antithetical to religion, most Islamic philosophers were devout Muslims who firmly
believed in the “possibility of gaining certitude intellectually” and argued that their rational
approach to understanding religion allowed them to gain a heightened understanding of God and
creation.283 For Ziai, especially after Ibn Sīnā (980 – 1037 CE), who is often called the greatest
Islamic philosopher, the history of Islamic philosophy can be thought of as a “quest to refine and
construct holistic philosophical systems” which also “uphold the deduced validity of revealed
truths” illustrating the extent to which the paths of reason and revelation are intertwined in Islamic
thought.284

II. Early Islamic Philosophy
Islamic philosophy, much like Islamic theology, was often sponsored by the state, and it
was largely due to the support of the Abbasids that large-scale translations of certain Greek texts
into Arabic were made possible. Al-Ma’mūn (813 – 833 CE), the very same caliph who enacted
the miḥna, is credited with organizing the work of translation on a much larger scale by setting up
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institutions such as the House of Wisdom (bayt al-ḥikma) in Baghdad, where philosophical works
were translated, copied, and edited, all the while being stored in an ever-growing library.285 Other
developments that took place under the Abbasids included developments in translation such as
using collated manuscripts as the basis for translation, and the beginning of translations from the
original Greek, rather than Syriac.286 Most of the Greek works that were translated during this time
had to do with science and philosophy, since the caliphs were interested in learning more about
Greek medical science to help protect their own health and the health of their subjects. This is why
many early Muslim philosophers were also physicians, who contributed greatly to the field of
medicine. Astrological and astronomical works were also given precedence in translation, but the
true turning point was when some members of the religious establishment turned towards
philosophy and its logical methods to use in their discussions with people of other religions.287
Such scholars felt the need to bring the philosophical conclusions of the Greek texts in line with
Islamic doctrines. We can see the culmination of such motives in the works of Abū-Yusūf Ya’qūb
ibn-Is’hāq Al-Kindī (c. 800–866 CE), one of the first Islamic philosophers and the only one of Arab
descent.288 Al-Kindī’s works are described as “Greek philosophy for Muslims” since he took upon
himself to try and synthesize Greek philosophy and Islamic thought.289 Al-Kindī notably shared
the views of the Mu’tazilites on many theological issues, since he lived around the time of their
rise to prominence during the caliphate of Al-Muʿtaṣim (833 –842 CE), and he was considered
closer to Islamic theological thought than other early Muslim philosophers.290
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For Al-Kindī, the Neoplatonic doctrine of God was similar to the type of monotheism
outlined in the Qur’an, and the truths revealed to prophets were equivalent to metaphysical
knowledge, such that there was no contradiction between revelation and philosophy.291 Al-Kindī
argued that God is “the first Truth who is the cause of all truth” and the cause of all beings, arguing
for a “unified cause of unity for all things” which must transcend any kind of predication.292 Based
on his ideas of God alone being eternal, and denying God’s Attributes, al-Kindī’s positions seem
to be similar to the Mu’tazila.293 Also like the Mu’tazila, al-Kindī argues that God cannot be known
through the intellect, and that we can only describe God using negative theology, or in other words
describe what He is not.294 For al-Kindī, God’s Unity and the proof of His Divinity is upheld in
that one can gain intellectual certainty of God, but the intellect is only able to describe God solely
in negative terms.295 Thus, the question of the Divine Attributes serves as a chief point of contact
between Mu’tazilite kalām and al-Kindī’s philosophy since both chose to assert God’s absolute
oneness through negative theology.296

III. The Avicennian Turn and the Avicennian Tradition
The central figure in Islamic philosophy is Ibn Sinā, also known as Avicenna (980–1037
CE), and many scholars assert that we should conceive of the tradition of Islamic philosophy as the

tradition that builds up to and stems from his works.297 Until Avicenna, the traditions of falsafah
and Kalām remained largely separate schools of thought, even though each was greatly influenced
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by the other.298 However after Avicenna, these two distinct schools merged and a post-Avicennan
Kalām emerged which was a synthesis of Avicenna’s metaphysics and Islamic doctrine.299 The
philosophizing of Sunni kalām by Avicenna has been called the “Avicennian Turn,” and is notably
one of the most important developments in Islamic intellectual history, since questions of morality
and free will which were central to the formative period of Kalām were replaced by the
metaphysical and ontological questions that Avicenna raised.300 Wisnovsky argues that the early
elements of this turn appeared even in Māturīdī Kitab al-Tawḥīd, which reveals that by Māturīdī’s
time, earlier issues dealt with by Kalām had already started to be replaced by more philosophical
concerns.301 Thus, the Kalām discourse that emerged from the Avicennian Turn was centered on
metaphysical and ontological matters such as the nature of being and existence (wujūd) and the
relationship between an entity and essence (dhāt) and its attributes (sifāt).302
The Avicennian Turn also radically configured Islamic discourse on the question of
eternality, which was previously linked to createdness. As we saw with the Muʿtazilah, rationalist
theologians believed that anything which can be said to be created cannot be eternal, which is why
groups like the Muʿtazilah argued that the Qur’an was uncreated, because if God’s Speech and His
other Attributes were eternal then they would share in divinity. However, after Ibn Sīnā, eternality
meant that something was necessary, or that must exist, whereas a created thing or something that
is caused is only conceived of as “possible” (since it can cease to exist).303 Thus the influence of
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Avicenna extends even to Kalām and arguably other strands of Islamic thought, such as Sufism,
as we will come to see in chapter three.
The impact of the Avicennian Turn in Kalām and the subsequent Avicennian tradition that
emerged from it can be seen in later Islamic philosophy and theology. Avicenna’s distinction
between essence and existence, and the difference he outlines between necessary existence and
possible existence opened up new concerns for subsequent mutakallimūn.304 Such post-Avicennian
mutakallimūn agreed that Avicenna’s analysis of God as the Necessary Existence in itself served
as a powerful proof for God’s existence, but they understood this to be indicative of God’s
transcendence, not the causal relationship between God and the world.305 One of the most
important questions they dealt with was whether or not God’s existence could be understood as an
Attribute. They pondered whether God’s existence could be viewed of as something additional to
His Self or Essence, like they understood God’s other Attributes of knowledge (‘ilm), power
(qudrah), and life (ḥayāt).306 Post-Avicennian mutakallimūn argued that necessity of existence
could be considered a meta-attribute, instead of the Attribute of eternity which was conceived of
as the most important meta-attribute previously, but which quickly led to complications since a
multiplicity of eternal things infringed upon Divine Oneness.307 For these later theologians, God’s
Self and Attributes are necessary of existence, but the Attributes were not necessary of existence
in themselves, since attributes are not “selves” but only “predicates of selves.”308 They concluded
that God’s Attributes are necessary of existence in God’s Self.309 Because of this synthesis of
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Muslim doctrine and Avicennian metaphysics, Wisnovsky calls the mutakallimūn “the torch
bearers of the Avicennian tradition in Islamic intellectual history.”310
Ibn Sīnā was born in a village called Afshana, near the city of Bukhara in modern-day
Uzbekistan, where he grew up studying Arabic grammar and literature, theology, and the Qur’an,
disciplines in which he demonstrated tremendous intellectual promise.311 Avicenna’s religious
education was completed by the time he was ten, and he was then tutored in philosophy and logic
by a traveling scholar named Nātilī, who quickly realized that his student exceeded even himself
in his understanding of ancient texts.312 Avicenna continued to study the Greek sciences on his
own, after his master left in pursuit of another pupil who was in greater need of his guidance. In
his course of self-study, he first examined works on mathematics, medicine, and physics, and then
studied logic, natural philosophy, and metaphysics.313 He finished his course of self-education in
eight years, and wrote that by the time he was eighteen he had completed his study of all of these
sciences, such that he learned nothing new afterwards, but his understanding of the texts
matured.314
Nasr writes that Ibn Sīnā is ultimately a “philosopher of Being,” because his conception of
knowledge involves “the analogy of the beings of particular things with Being itself which stands
above and anterior to the Universe.”315 Ibn Sīnā essentially conceives of Being as the inner reality
of each thing, and the source of goodness, beauty, and the cause of perception.316 Central to his
‘philosophy of Being’ is the separation between essence (māhiyya) and existence (wujūd) on the
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one hand, and the tripartite division between the Necessary (wājib), contingent (mumkin), and
impossible (mumtani‘) beings on the other.317 In his ontological scheme, only in God or the
Necessary Being (wājib al-wujūd) can essence and existence be united, since the Necessary Being
is the source of all existence.318 For Ibn Sīnā the notion of essence answers the question ‘what is
it?’319, because if one knows the essence of something, one knows the attributes of that thing as
well.320 Avicenna addresses the question of Divine Attributes and Essence namely through this
ontological framework. God, as the Necessary Being exists “due-to-Itself” such that He has no
essence or quiddity (māhiyya) other than His existence (wujūd).321 In this sense, like the Muʿtazilah
before him, Avicenna’s ontology undermines the personal character of God, and the various ways
in which the Divine is experienced by believers, through an adherence to a purely intellectual
understanding of God.322 This radical reduction of the God of Muslims to simply the “Necessary
Existent” was preposterous for al-Ghazālī. As Wisnovsky explains, al-Ghazālī argued that if
Avicenna expected Muslim intellectuals to simply reduce all of the names and acts of God “so
clearly and powerfully described in the Qur’an to one single, simple name – the necessary of
existence in itself – and to one single, simple act – self intellection” then not much of Islamic
doctrine would be left.323
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IV. Al-Ghazālī’s Critique of Falsafah
The most significant response to this shift in philosophical thinking sparked by Avicenna
thus came from Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazālī who criticized the Peripatetic views of Muslim
philosophers, and Avicenna in particular.324 In his The Incoherence of the Philosophers al-Ghazālī
helps explain some of the general philosophical ideas about the issue of the Divine names, and
refutes Avicenna’s beliefs using the framework of Ashʿarī kalām. For al-Ghazālī, the philosophers
claimed that it was impossible to affirm Attributes of Knowledge, Power, and Will for God,
arguing that the Divine Names revealed in the Qur’an were to be used “verbally” since they are
“referentially” reduced to the Divine Essence.325 He claims that the philosophers deny the
Attributes out of a desire to prevent the “plurality” that arises from affirming their existence.326
For al-Ghazālī, such a belief is opposed by “all the Muslims,” with the only exception being the
philosophically inclined Mu’tazila.327 Al-Ghazālī argues that if an attribute, and that to which it is
attributed are not the same, then each will be in need of the other in order “to be.” However, if
both are free of a need for the other, then both would be necessary existents in and of themselves,
which overrides the concept of a single necessary existent upon which all existents emanate.328 If
one lacks a need of another, but is needed by it, it effectively becomes the cause of the other, which
means that which is in need is characterized by a lack, which cannot apply to the Divine.329 Thus,
for al-Ghazālī the “incoherence” of such a belief is clear, since the improbability of both scenarios
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means that the essence of the “Necessary Existent is eternal without agents, and so are His
attributes.”330
Al-Ghazālī also refutes a second claim made by the philosophers regarding the Divine
Attributes, namely that affirming the Divine Attributes implies that the Necessary Existent cannot
be entirely self-sufficient; in other words, because the Divine does not need anything other than
Himself, He does not need the Attributes.331 However, such ideas are part of a “language of
rhetorical preaching that is feeble in the extreme” for al-Ghazālī, since the “attributes of perfection
do not separate from the essence of the Perfect, so as to say that He is in need of another.”332 In
this statement, al-Ghazālī upholds the Ash’arite doctrine that the Attributes are not simply reduced
to the Essence, but are “coeternal with it without cause.”333 The “incoherence” of the philosophers
is also clear in their affirmation that God is a knower, since affirming this fact is indicative of
accepting an addition to the Divine Essence, namely the Attribute of Knowledge. Where Avicenna
argues that God knows Himself and everything else in a universal way, al-Ghazālī argues that such
a position is an affirmation of God’s Attribute of knowledge.334 Thus, the philosophers continue
their avoidance of plurality through a denial of any Attribute, even going so far as to claim that “if
the First were to have a quiddity characterized by existence then this would constitute multiplicity”
based on the Avicennian view that the Essence and existence of the Necessary Existent are
unified.335 However, for al-Ghazālī, if the Essence is His Will, Power, or Knowledge, then this
means that these Attributes are self-subsisting, but this is impossible because this implies multiple
necessary existents.336
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Al-Ghazālī’s critique of the philosophers sparked developments in the traditions of Kalām
and falsafah, since many later philosophers responded to his refutations and many theologians
began to integrate some aspects of the philosophical tradition into their works.337 Although alGhazālī was the most influential Muslim theologian to engage with Avicenna’s thought, by the
eleventh century, Avicenna’s system had become one of the most important challenges to Kalām.
Ibn Sinā’s teachings had a significant influence even on those theologians who rejected aspects of
his philosophy, reflecting the extent to which his system had permeated later discourse about the
ontological and metaphysical topics he introduced.338 In the Incoherence, al-Ghazālī refutes those
Avicennian ideas he deemed contrary to Islamic belief, and he ultimately concluded that three of
these theories were entirely opposed to Muslim belief: the philosophers’ theory of a pre-eternal
world, Avicenna’s theory that God knows universals rather than particulars, and Avicenna’s theory
of an immortal soul that denies bodily resurrection.339 His refutation of these three Avicennian
theories and labeling of such beliefs as infidelity (kufr) was very influential in guiding the direction
of all future philosophical works in Islamic intellectual history, since scholars felt that they had to
respond to al-Ghazālī.340Al-Ghazālī’s ability to explain philosophical doctrine also allowed for the
teaching of what was an accepted type of philosophy, namely the use of rational methods to
expound traditional Muslim belief on certain issues.341 Thus, al-Ghazālī’s work, which some
argued brought about the end of the tradition of falsafah, actually gave the tradition a new
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motivation and scope.342 Imam Ghazālī’s works even served as a “textbook genre of falsafah”
which was accepted and studied in many scholastic centers.343

V. Philosophy and Mysticism: Mullā Ṣadrā’s al-ḥikmah al-mutaʿāliyah
Al-Ghazālī’s critique of falsafah also had an impact in the Islamic East, where falsafah was
combined with the tradition of gnosis (ʿirfān), a synthesis which provided the mystical tradition
with a language that helped to articulate the mystical experience of “pure consciousness.”344 The
integration of falsafah and mysticism not only allowed for the means to provide an account of the
mystical experience, but also a practice that allows for the attainment of the highest form of
knowledge.345 Mullā Ṣadrā, or Ṣadr al-Dīn al-Shīrāzī (c. 1571–1640 CE), one of the most important
figures in the history of post-Avicennan philosophy, and one of the greatest Islamic
metaphysicians from the Muslim East,346 was one of the figures who combined his philosophy and
mysticism to produce a new system of philosophy. Mullā Ṣadrā founded a new school of Islamic
thought, which he termed the “transcendent theosophy” or al-ḥikmah al-mutaʿāliyah, which
seamlessly synthesized Sunnī and Shī’ī kalām, the Peripatetic or mashshāīʿ ī school of Ibn Sinā,347
ishrāq or the school of Illumination founded by Shihāb al-Dīn Suhrawardī (1154–1191 CE),
andʿirfān or speculative Sufism, mainly in terms of the school of Ibn al-‘Arabī (1165–1240 CE).348
Mullā Ṣadrā’s ‘Transcendent Philosophy’ represents a new trend in Islamic philosophy, which is
342
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neither Peripatetic nor Illuminationist, but a synthesis of both which takes the best arguments from
each to form a new system.349 His vast knowledge of the Qur’an and ḥadīth, Islamic philosophy
and theology, and Sufism combined with his intellectual prowess as a philosopher and gnostic
allowed him to synthesize the millennium of Islamic thought which preceded him.350 His creative
philosophical framework had a strong influence on subsequent Islamic philosophy, and to this day
in regions such as Persia, Iraq, and the Indian subcontinent Mullā Ṣadra’s school of thought
continues to be a powerful intellectual tradition.351
Mullā Ṣadrā’s transcendent philosophy sought to combine three kinds of knowledge,
revealed knowledge (through the Qur’an), logical or demonstrative knowledge (burhān), and
mystical or realized knowledge (ʿirfān).352 The combination of these three paths of human
knowledge was central to Ṣadrā’s philosophy, and why his intellectual perspective is called alḥikmah al-mutaʿāliyah or “transcendent philosophy,” since the synthesis of these three modes of
knowing allows for one to truly possess the highest level of knowledge, such that the philosopher
or theosopher characterizes themselves with the Divine Qualities in order to become “God-like.”353
The foundation of this theosophy is the science of being (wujūd), by which Mullā Ṣadrā refers to
existence of objects, and the existence of Pure Being.354 For Mullā Ṣadrā, existence is the principal
reality that includes all that is, a view which contrasts with those held by Suhrawardī and other
philosophers who argued for the primacy of essence. Whereas other philosophers argued that what
gives reality to things is essence, Mullā Ṣadrā argued that it is existence which is the most apparent
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and visible feature of a thing’s reality.355 Based on this theory, his “gradational ontology” sees “all
beings as a symphony of the infinite modalities and manifestations of one single existence.”356
This theory is directly influenced by his Illuminationist philosophical leanings and the school of
Ibn al-‘Arabī where the philosopher is ultimately able to experience reality as pure Being.
In his al-Maẓāhir al-Ilāhīyah fī Asrār al-‘ulūm al-Kamālīyah (“The Divine Manifestations
of the Secrets of the Perfecting Sciences”) Mullā Ṣadrā states that “acquiring the true divine
wisdom” and “completing the material intellects” occurs by knowing “Allāh and His Attributes,
His kingdom and dominion, and knowing the Hereafter and its stations and states” in order to
become a true “wayfarer on the path of gnosis” and “proximity to the Merciful.”357 Thus, in order
to attain the gnostic experience of the unity of being (wujūd) which occurs once the gnostic realizes
that it is only wujūd which bestows reality upon any one thing, such that every single thing has no
reality in itself, one has to know God’s Attributes.358 Mullā Ṣadrā thus devotes an entire section of
his al-Maẓāhir to explain the “Unity of His Attributes of Perfection,” where he argues that the
Divine Attributes are “absolutely immaterial and are not added to His essence.”359 For Mullā
Ṣadrā, the only difference between the Attributes is in meaning, since all of the Attributes of
perfection derive from the Divine Essence.360 He argues that the Attributes essentially represent
the same Essence, since “His knowledge is His very power, His power is His very knowledge, and
His will is both of them.”361 This argument is derived from Ibn Sīnā who writes in his al-Ta‘liqāt
that “the First is not multiplied because of the multiplicity of His Attributes, for each one of His
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Attributes when realized becomes the Attribute for His other Attribute.”362 Thus, for Ibn Sīnā and
Mullā Ṣadrā, saying that all of the Attributes are essentially reducible to the one Essence does not
divest God of His Attributes, but explains the unity of the Attributes in regards to the Divine
essence, since all of them derive from a single essence.
Mullā Ṣadrā supplements his position by citing a quote from ʿAlī ibn ʾAbī Ṭālib: “The
perfection of monotheism is to dissociate all Attributes from Him,” which he interprets not as a
call to purify the Essence of the meanings of the Attributes (since doing so is tantamount to
“denying His Attributes, which is manifest disbelief”), but instead as a warning to dissociate “any
Attributes additional to His Essence according to its existence and reality.”363 Thus, Mullā Ṣadrā
agrees that one can say “His Attributes are equal to Him,” as the philosophers do, and also say
“They are not Him” or “They are neither Him nor other than Him” which is the Ash’arite view of
the Divine Names and Attributes. 364 He goes on to explain that the knowledge of the Divine Names
and Attributes is a “sacred knowledge” which allowed Adam to surpass even the angels, as narrated
in Qur'anic verses 2:31-33.365 Mullā Ṣadrā writes that the Name is “the concept that is predicated
upon the essence” such that the difference between name and attribute is like the difference
between “white” and “whiteness,” where the named thing may be one, while the names are many,
since they are “intellectual predicates” or “definitions for the essence they describe.”366 He
concludes that all beings are manifestations or glimmers of God’s Attributes, in varying degrees,
whereas the Prophet Muḥammad is “the manifestation of all the divine Attributes in an equal way”
and is thus “like the equator in all realms of existence.”367 In this view, the Divine Names and
362
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Attributes become more than simply a doctrine but also a praxis of human perfection, which the
wayfarer can use to attain the desired proximity to the Divine. This idea is central to the Islamic
mystical tradition, where the gnostic can strive towards perfection by taking on the Divine Names
and qualities, such that the self is annihilated, subsisting in pure Being alone.
VI. Reconciling Reason and Experience: The Aims of Falsafah
Mullā Ṣadrā defines philosophy as the “perfecting of the human soul through cognition of
the realities of existents as they truly are” which allows human beings to “ascribe a rational order
to the world and acquire a resemblance to the Creator according to the measure of human
capacity.”368 In this regard, philosophy is considered a “way of life” and most importantly a “path
to salvation” in training the soul.369 The ultimate goal of such philosophy or wisdom reflects the
Platonic emphasis on theosis or ta’alluh, the idea of “becoming god so far as is possible,” an
emulation which is central to the Sufi teaching of qualifying oneself with the Attributes of God.370
Islamic philosophy, as we discussed earlier in this section, was never merely “theoretical inquiry
seeking knowledge for its own sake” but rather always had a purpose of upholding revelation
through reason, and acquiring knowledge about the Divine in relation to human beings.371
Knowledge of the Divine of course can come about in many different ways for different people,
and many of the figures examined in this section gained a proficiency in multiple streams of
Islamic thought, often settling only for a unique synthesis of those systems which they found the
most appealing. Al-Ghazālī, for example, found philosophy inadequate because it was an indirect
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means of acquiring truth, whereas mysticism allowed one to experience or taste (dhawq) the state
of truth and combine knowledge and action to achieve certainty.372
Al-Ghazālī’s distaste of the purely intellectual mode of gaining certainty illustrates the
early break in Islamic intellectual history between the paths of reason and experience. Later Islamic
philosophers in the East, and perhaps most importantly, Mullā Ṣadrā, were able to reconcile reason
and experience by recovering a philosophy which “combined rational discourse with intuitive
experience” and discovered a method for inquiry into the truth which allows for spiritual perfection
and salvation.373 Islamic mysticism as the esoteric (batīn) dimension of Islam is essentially a path
of knowledge, which is why Nasr argues that Islamic philosophy and mysticism have had a close
relationship in the history of Islamic thought, such that we can say that the Islamic philosophers
“belong to the same spiritual family as the Sufis, both being concerned with the attainment of
ultimate knowledge.”374 Even in early Islamic Peripatetic philosophy, such as that of Ibn Sīnā we
can see his interest in Sufism, since he devoted entire works to defending mysticism and the
attainment of hidden knowledge about the spiritual world by gnostics.375 In the Islamic West, the
tradition of Islamic philosophy was permeated by Sufism, as all of the Islamic philosophers of
Spain evinced a mystical dimension to their thought.376 The eventual synthesis of philosophy and
mysticism that emerged in Persia with Suhrawardī and later Mullā Ṣadrā bound philosophy to
spiritual purification and the mystical life, which became so influential that it characterized most
subsequent Islamic philosophy.377
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Thus, early Islamic philosophy shares many of the views on the doctrine of the Names and
Attributes as rationalist theologians did. For these rational scholars, the Divine Attributes cannot
be considered additional to the Divine Essence, since such a view violates Divine Unity. Thus, the
philosophers hold that the Attributes are equal to God’s Essence and not separate from It. Yet, for
Islamic philosophers, this position is not a denial of the Attributes, since they hold that the
Attributes are only different in meaning and all of them represent the same Divine Essence. On
the subject of the doctrine of tawḥīd and the Divine Names, philosophers such as Ibn Sīnā argue
that Divine Unity is not compromised due to the multiplicity of the Attributes because the
Attributes are all unified in the Divine Essence. Like many Islamic theologians, some philosophers
also tended to emphasize certain characteristics of God to shape their conception of the Divine.
Ibn Sīnā’s view of God is centered around His Being and Existence, compared to the Mu’tazilite
emphasis on Divine Unity, and the Ashʿarite and Māturīdite emphasis on God’s Omnipotence and
Wisdom respectively. The theological and philosophical schools of thought we have mentioned
thus far kept in mind the tanzīh view of the Divine. Although Traditionalist theologians tried to
reconcile the tashbīh verses of the Qur’an, these theologians did not fully explore the meanings of
these verses. Ṣūfī thought was able to take those tashbīh verses and reconcile them with the tanzīh
verses of the Qur’an, and offer a take on the Divine Names that is at once grounded in the tradition,
and unlike anything we have seen thus far in our study of these intellectual traditions. Unlike the
theologians and philosophers, the Ṣūfīs combine theory with practice, and explain that the Names
are central to understanding what it means to be human beings.

79

Chapter 3
The Way of Experience
Sufism or Taṣawwuf is often called the inner dimension of Islam, as it is the direct
contemplation of the Divine Reality with the ultimate aim of gaining direct access to knowledge
of the Truth.378 Rather than being something foreign to Islam, Sufism is an intensification of the
spiritual path found in the religious tradition, and all Ṣūfī masters claim spiritual ‘descent’ to the
Prophet himself. Like other schools of Islamic thought, Sufism has been passed down by such
masters who help guide their students in shaping their character (khuluq) and bringing it into
conformity with the prophetic model.379 This process acquired a name, the science of human
character traits (akhlāq), which characterized the ultimate aims of Sufism, what the “greatest
master” (al-Shaykh al-Akbar) of Sufism, Muḥyī al-Dīn Ibn ‘Arabī (1165–1240 CE)380 defined as
“assuming the character traits of God.”381 For Ṣūfī sages like Ibn ‘Arabī, all human beings have
the ability to actualize the Divine traits latent in their very own souls by virtue of being created in
God’s image. The Ṣūfī path requires the soul to traverse various stations (maqāmāt) of “spiritual
ascent” and overcome the various psychological states (aḥwāl) in order to approach the Divine
Reality.382 Thus, Sufism or the mystical dimension of Islam, deals with experiencing the Divine
Reality rather than trying to come to know the object of worship through intellectual exercises
alone like kalām or falsafah. Whereas other schools of Islamic thought tended to emphasize Divine
transcendence above all else, Ṣūfīs emphasized those verses of the Qur’an and those Names and
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Attributes which indicated God’s immanence and presence, and argued that rational proofs and
theological arguments undermined the personal relationship between God and human beings. For
the Ṣūfīs, God’s Nearness is more real than His Distance, because the Attributes of Beauty are
what ultimately allow human beings to come to love God.383

I. The Ṣūfī Path
The term Sufism derives from ṣūf or “the one who wears wool,” and the term was used to
describe the coarse woolen garment worn by the early Muslim ascetics.384 Gradually the
designation was extended to those Muslims who distinguished themselves from the community by
stressing certain Qur’anic and prophetic teachings and practices.385 Al-Junayd (c. 830–910), one
of the most famous Ṣūfī saints of the early period, explains that Sufism is not mere ascetism,
however, since “Sufism is not [achieved] by much praying and fasting, but it is the security of the
heart and the generosity of the soul.”386 The ascetic aspect of Sufism comes from the break with
the world and the desires of the ego in favor of yearning for the Divine Beloved alone; “Sufism is
to possess nothing and to be possessed by nothing.”387 Sufism has also been defined as “an
interiorization of Islam, a personal experience of the central mystery of Islam, that of tawḥīd” or
affirming that God is One.388 For Ṣūfīs like al-Hujwīrī (d. c. 1072) “knowledge is immense and
life is short,” meaning that the only knowledge which is obligatory for a human being is that which
brings one closer to the object of worship.389 In the Ṣūfī view, true knowledge cannot be achieved
through books, because experiential knowledge is far superior to anything than can be taught.
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Thus, many Ṣūfīs report throwing away their books after attaining the knowledge they sought, and
as Schimmel notes, one of the first steps for some mystics was to “break the ink-pots and to tear
the books.”390 Some Ṣūfī masters reportedly cleansed the minds of their students of all they had
studied in order to purify them, and others report having dreams which urged them to cast all of
their books into the nearest river.391 Nonetheless, even though Ṣūfīs condemned the bookishness
of scholars and chastised their disciples to “strive to lift the veil, not to collect books,” the Ṣūfīs
were amongst the most prolific Muslim writers, with numerous Ṣūfī writers like Ibn ‘Arabī
producing some of the lengthiest extant works in Islamic intellectual history, such as his magnum
opus al-Futūḥāt al-Makkiyyah (The Meccan Openings) which spans thousands of pages.392
Some authors chose the term iḥsān or “doing what is beautiful” to describe the
phenomenon of Sufism.393Iḥsān is frequently mentioned in the Qur’an, and God says that He loves
those who possess this quality.394 The term iḥsān is also mentioned in the famous ḥadīth of Gabriel,
where the Prophet describes iḥsān as the innermost dimension of faith that arises from a deepened
understanding and allows one to “worship God as if you see Him.”395 Whereas iḥsān was
actualized through Ṣūfī teachings and practices, the other two parts of the religion that the Prophet
was questioned about: islām (“submission” or “correct activity”) and imān (“faith” or “correct
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understanding”) are manifested through the sharī‘ah and jurisprudence, and kalām respectively.396
Where the sharī‘ah outlines the way in which people can submit their actions to the instructions
of the Qur’an and the sunnah, and Kalām defines the contents of faith and provides a rational
defense for Qur’anic teachings, Sufism combines both theory and practice and explains how
Muslims can “strengthen their understanding and observance of Islam in order to find God’s
presence in themselves and the world.”397 The Ṣūfīs argue that the element of iḥsān allows for the
complete interiorization of Islam, since the believer recognizes that he or she is in the presence of
God and must behave with the utmost sincerity (ikhlāṣ) while experiencing the “all-embracing
Divine presence.”398 To achieve this spiritual station, Ṣūfīs intensified Islamic ritual practice
through an increased focus on adhering to the Sunnah, especially in terms of the ritual
remembrance of God (dhikr).

II. The Continual Remembrance of God: The Gateway to Gnosis and Love
The remembrance of God (dhikr) is central to Ṣūfī doctrine and praxis, since gnosis is the
fruit of continuously practicing dhikr.399 In his Ṣūfī manual on the excellence of invocation, AlQaṣd Al-Mujarrad fī Marifat Al-Ism Al-Mufrad (The Key to Salvation and the Lamp of Souls), Ibn
ʿAṭā Allāh al-Iskandarī (1259–1310 CE) the renowned Ṣūfī saint of the Shādhilī order, writes that
it is the remembrance of God’s Name which opens “sealed hearts,” lifts the “veil of defects,” and
“purifies the innermost nature of hearts to confer upon them His own mysterious Self.”400 For Ibn
ʿAṭā Allāh, dhikr is the very “foundation of the Path” and the “pivotal support” which ultimately
396
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leads to ‘experiential’ knowledge of the One.401As he explains, only dhikr liberates human beings
from ignorance and forgetfulness, allowing for the permanent realization of the Truth, a statement
which echoes Prophetic sayings such as: “The world and all that is in it is accursed, except for the
remembrance of God,” and “Let thy tongue be always moist with the remembrance of God,” which
advocate for a continual remembrance of God at all times.402 The centrality of dhikr in Islamic
spirituality is made clear in such Prophetic traditions, and Qur’anic verses such as 2:152: So
Remember Me and I shall remember you, 13:28: Are not hearts at peace in the remembrance of
God, and 29:45: The remembrance of God is surely greater.403 As Ibn ʿAṭā Allāh explains, dhikr
can take the form of supplication, remembrance of God’s messengers, prophets, saints, or occur
through a deed such as reciting the Qur’an, invoking a Name of God, poetry, singing, or telling a
story, since all of these various actions remind one of God.404 Thus, any person who meditates on
any Act, Attribute, or Command of God, or any of His signs which permeate the heavens and the
earth, practices remembrance.405
The practice of dhikr allows the soul to continually focus on God, an action which delivers
spiritual nourishment to the heart in order to bring it closer to God.406 ʿĀ’ishah al-Bāʿūniyyah (c.
1456 –1517 CE), one of the great women scholars and mystics in Islamic history, explains, through
remembrance, “the ascension to union will occur, the door of closeness will be opened, and [the
mystic] will be ushered into the presence of vision, and seated on the carpet of intimacy.”407 Ibn
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ʿAṭā Allāh echoes al-Bāʿūniyyah’s statement, noting that invoking is the “door to spiritual union”
and the “greatest of gateways” leading to God’s love.408 Remembrance is thus considered essential
since the spiritual station of the one who invokes constantly is exalted such that the one who
invokes achieves closeness with God. Sincere and sustained remembrance extinguishes the self, a
station Ṣūfīs call fanā’, where everything but God fades away. However, after the state of
extinction of the self, the state of baqā’ or subsistence occurs, where the soul persists in God, and
attains a spiritual “union” with God. Dhikr thus purifies the heart of other than God, allowing for
the heart rather than the tongue to affirm the doctrine of tawḥīd.409 The end result of love is “total
absorption” or vanishment of the lover in the presence of the Beloved. Because of this, Ibn ‘Arabī
called love the “highest station of the soul” since it allows for the “complete absorption of the
human will by Divine attraction.”410
Dhikr is therefore considered the pinnacle of human actions, and the invocation is given
such an exalted status in terms of religious practice primarily because it leads to the station of
‘mystical union.’ However, in order to bring about such a spiritual transformation, the state of the
heart must be changed. In the Ṣūfī and Islamic perspective, the heart (al-qalb), rather than the
mind, is the seat of consciousness, and the “eye of the heart” (‘ayn al-qalb) must be opened in
order to truly actualize tawḥīd and attain spiritual union with God. The heart is called the mystery
(as-sirr) or the “inapprehensible point” where the human being meets God.411 The heart’s role as
the meeting place between human beings and the Divine has foundations in a Divine saying
revealed through the Prophet in which God said, “The heavens and the earth cannot contain Me,
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but the heart of my believing servant does contain Me.”412Al-Bāʿūniyyah explains that the lover’s
heart is the “place of vision,” which God fills with the “light of love” in order to reveal His
Essence.413 For the Ṣūfīs, it is love of the Divine which “seizes” hearts and the very existence of
the mystic themselves, because love “effaces being and annihilates everything.”414 However, like
al-Bāʿūniyyah notes, “love is God’s grace,” and the way in which God’s love for the worshipper
becomes clear is through His selection of the worshipper for the secret by “seizing him with the
Beloved’s attraction and effacing annihilations until the worshipper is without a sense of self in
light of the sun of true oneness.”415
This state of absorption signals the perfection of human knowledge, since knowledge of
God, the object of worship and love, is the goal of the way in that knowledge of the Divine
transforms the heart and penetrates the soul.416 The Ṣūfī path thus strives for a balance between
knowledge and love, even though various Ṣūfīs have emphasized either the way of knowledge
(such as al-Junayd and Ibn ‘Arabī) or the way of love (like Jalāl ad-Dīn Rūmī, Rābiʿa al-ʿAdawiyya
(717–801 CE), and ʿĀ’ishah al-Bāʿūniyyah).417 The last two stations on the mystical path, love
(maḥabbah) and gnosis (maʿrifah), have often been considered complementary to one another,
however oftentimes either love or gnosis was upheld as the superior station of the soul.418 As alGhazālī explains, love and knowledge are inextricably linked, since “love without gnosis is
impossible – one can only love what one knows.”419 Ibn ʿAṭā Allāh holds that gnosis is “the
perception of something as it is in its essence and attributes.”420 However, he also notes that
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because of this dual perception as both essence and attribute, gnosis of the Creator is the most
difficult types of gnosis, because “God has no likeness,” and His Essence is only known to
Himself.421 The difficulty of gnosis of God has also been mentioned in Prophetic traditions such
as “Meditate not on the Essence but on the Qualities of God and on His Grace.”422 In book thirtynine, On Meditation (Kitāb al-Tafakkur), of his 40-volume magnum opus, The Revival of the
Religious Sciences (Iḥyā′ ‘Ulūm al-Dīn), al-Ghazālī explains that the Prophetic warning against
trying to contemplate the Divine Essence exists because human beings do not have the strength to
endure such reflection and “cannot know its magnitude.”423 Al-Ghazālī writes that the greatest
station of meditation is indeed upon the Divine Essence and Attributes,424 but, as Burckhardt
explains, since the Divine Essence cannot be grasped by human thought, worshippers can only
conceive of the Divine Names and Qualities.425 Yet in spite of this, Ibn ʿAṭā Allāh writes that God
has enjoined upon Creation “the gnosis of His Essence, His Names, and His Attributes” since
everything which has been given being “is conscious of the Being of its creator to the extent of its
capacity.”426 The heart of the believer affirms the oneness of God’s Essence, and the gnostic, whom
God causes to contemplate His Names and Attributes, gains certitude through religious devotions
and contemplation. Since the organ of true knowledge or gnosis is the heart, “knowledge of God
always engenders love,” because the perfection of human knowledge is when nothing human
remains, since the object of both human knowledge and love is God.427 Through sincere
contemplation of the Divine, the hearts of believers are transformed such that “their inner meanings
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are His Attributes, their reality is His Essence.”428 Knowledge of the Divine Names and Attributes
and sustained contemplation of them are thus central to gnosis and love, and the attainment of
spiritual union.

III. Ibn ʿAṭā Allāh al-Iskandarī on the Science of Using the Divine Names in Dhikr
Because of the crucial role of the Divine Names in remembrance, different Ṣūfī authors
have offered their interpretations of how to acquire the benefit of the various Names in religious
devotions. Another definition Ibn ʿAṭā Allāh gives for dhikr is the “repetition of the Name of the
Invoked by the heart and the tongue,” which refers to the Ṣūfī practice of invoking the Divine
Names. The invocation by the tongue refers to the invocation of the letters of God’s Names, a
practice which he briefly outlines in his manual. In this manual of invocation, Ibn ʿAṭā Allāh tells
his readers that God’s Most Beautiful Names are “medicine for the maladies of the heart,” and
explains the spiritual benefit gained by invoking the various Names. He explains that the Name
al-Hādī (“The Guide”) is beneficial during spiritual retreat (khalwah) because it eliminates the
states of “dispersion and distraction,” and allows the invoker to remember that his continual
seeking of God’s help is “what is sought from him.”429 Invoking the Name al-Ghanī (“the Rich”)
is recommended for those who wish to disengage from worldly attachments but have difficultly
doing so alone.430 The invocation of the Name al-Hannān (“The Affectionate) during spiritual
retreats “strengthens intimacy until it takes its practitioner to love,” whereas the Name al-Barr
(“The Benign”) bestows intimacy and “partial insight” but does not lead to union.431 Invoking the
Divine Name ar-Raqīb (“the Watcher”) awakens the forgetful from their slumber, allows the
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“wakeful” to remain in such a state, and frees pious worshippers from hypocrisy.432 However, Ibn
ʿAṭā Allāh notes that neither gnostics nor those who have control over their actions need to invoke
this Name, since their spiritual station indicates that they are fully aware of this Divine Quality.433
Yet, for those suffering an illness of the heart due to the “malady of forgetfulness,” he argues that
the repeated invocation of this Name allows worshippers to reach the “state of presence with God”
due to their pious devotion and invocation with the heart.434
Ibn ʿAṭā Allāh explains the virtues of invocation and instructs the reader on how dozens of
other Names are to be used in ritual practice. Many of the Names he mentions, which we have also
mentioned here, lead to spiritual union or love, whereas others lead to varying degrees of
“illumination.” He explains that the invocation of His Names such as al-Fattāḥ (“the Opener”) and
al-Awwal (“the First”) hasten illumination, whereas the Name al-Nūr (“the Light”), although quick
to bestow “light and insight on those in retreat,” rarely ever bestows total illumination on the one
who invokes it.435 He also offers a list of Names which shaykhs (spiritual guides) should advise
their students to use in various stages of the spiritual path, such as recommending the Name alMuʿīd (“the Restorer”) to those students whom the shaykh fears will become imbalanced after
illumination and could benefit from temporary “veiling.”436Through invocation of various Names
and Qualities, the wayfarer is ultimately able to reflect on different Divine Qualities which most
pertain to his or her situation and attain the goal of gnosis and love of God.
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IV. Ibn ‘Arabī’s Doctrine of the Divine Names
Perhaps the lengthiest contemplation on the Divine Names comes from the writings of
Muḥyī al-Dīn Ibn ‘Arabī (1165–1240 CE), the great Andalusian mystic whom Nasr calls the
“expositor par excellence of gnosis.”437 Ibn ‘Arabī is known in Islamic intellectual history as the
one who explicitly formulated the theoretical and metaphysical doctrines of Sufism and exposited
the spiritual universe of Sufism and its theoretical aspects such that anyone can contemplate the
Ṣūfī path. Although many of the formulations he uses, such as the transcendent unity of Being
(waḥdat al-wujūd)438 and the Perfect or Universal man (al-insān al-kamīl), are given such
designations for the first time in his works, Nasr explains that these doctrines existed earlier in the
tradition, but had never been presented in such a systematic manner.439 Thus, Ibn ‘Arabī became
widely known partly because of his formulation of the doctrines of Sufism and his ability to explain
and clarify essential Ṣūfī doctrines. Although his legacy has sometimes been viewed as a shift to
a more theoretical trend in Sufism, or a movement towards pantheism, what Ibn ‘Arabī’s explicit
formulation of Ṣūfī doctrine really indicates is a need for further explanation and clarification of
Ṣūfī thought, especially since by his time Islamic civilization had drawn further away from the
source of revelation and needed additional explanations in the face of what Nasr calls ‘diminished
spiritual insight.’440 Ibn ‘Arabī’s reformation of Ṣūfī doctrine was so successful that it has
“dominated the spiritual and intellectual life of Islam ever since.”441 Thus, when looking to the
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Ṣūfī view of the Divine Names and Attributes, it is only appropriate that we look to Ibn ‘Arabī’s
doctrines for guidance.
William Chittick writes that almost every page of Ibn ‘Arabi’s magnum opus, al-Futūḥāt
al-Makkiyah (“The Meccan Openings”) deals with the question of the Divine Name and Attributes
either indirectly or directly.442 Furthermore, he notes that the Divine Names “provide the backdrop
to everything [Ibn ‘Arabī] says,” since all of his works contain the theme of the Divine Names and
Attributes.443 Chittick argues that the “Divine names are the single most important concept to be
found” in his works since everything “Divine or cosmic, is related back to them.”444 However, this
is not unusual, since most works in Islamic intellectual history that discuss God always speak of
God in terms of the specific Names He has used to describe Himself. Chittick calls the Divine
Names the “connecting thread” of the Qur’an because of the way in which they repeatedly appear
throughout the text.445 The Names summarize what can be said and understood about God, so Ibn
‘Arabī’s emphasis on the Names is due to the subject matter at hand. For Ibn ‘Arabī, everything
from the Divine Essence to the most “insignificant creature in the cosmos” is related to the Divine
Names and Attributes. Furthermore, the Divine Essence, which is indeed unknown in Itself, is
named by the Names, meaning that the Essence and Attributes are not two realities of Essence and
Name, but a single reality called the Essence, which is given specific Names in given contexts,
and from particular points of view.446
The question at the heart of all of Ibn ‘Arabī’s works is: how can I find God? Ibn ‘Arabī
argues that the desire to seek and find God motivates all human beings, as it gives them their
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humanity.447 Once human beings answer this question, it becomes vital for them to verify the truth
of their answer, not simply through theory but through finding God “in fact.”448 For Ibn ‘Arabī,
those who are able to find God are the “People of Unveiling and Finding” (ahl al-kashf wa’lwujūd) since they were able to lift the veils that bar them from recognizing their Lord, in order to
“stand in His Presence.”449 Ibn ‘Arabī holds that the goal these “Verifiers” (muḥaqqiqūn) have
attained is open to everyone, and he outlines the path to such knowledge of the true nature of the
cosmos and man in extreme detail in his works.450 The idea connected with Ibn ‘Arabī, waḥdat alwujūd, the “Oneness of Being” or “Unity of Being,” reflects something of this journey, since the
word “wujūd” can also be translated as “finding.”451 Although his works appear outwardly
philosophical, or concerned solely with the mental concept of being, Chittick states that Ibn
‘Arabī’s main concern in his works is the experience of God’s Being, an experience Ṣūfīs often
call “taste” (dhawq).452 Here, we will not delve into the all of the metaphysical concepts Ibn ‘Arabī
touches across his works, but will aim to explain how the Divine Names and Attributes serve as a
means for attaining gnosis in the thought of Ibn ‘Arabī, particularly in terms of achieving the state
of human perfection through the systematic actualization of the entire set of Divine Attributes.
Although the concepts we outline here may seem largely theoretical, the reader must keep in mind
that Sufism is conceived of as the way of experience, rather than simply of following revelation or
reason.
Finding God, for Ibn ‘Arabī, leads to bewilderment, the bewilderment of “finding and
knowing God and not-knowing Him at the same time.”453 As he explains, all human beings, and
447
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in fact all of creation, oscillate between affirmation and negation,454 finding and losing, knowing
and not-knowing.455 The Verifiers are able to recognize this human situation because they know
that the answer to every question regarding God or the world must be expressed as “Yes and no”
or He/not He (huwa lā huwa), since everything contains traces of God’s Names and Attributes
which allow us to affirm similarity, but the Essence is, by virtue of its very nature, transcendent.
The Verifiers are able to see the nature of the universe for what it really is; rather than ecstatically
uttering “All is He” (hama ūst) as some Ṣūfīs tended to do in mystical trance, the Verifiers are able
to say “All is He, all is not He.”456 Thus, the question, “how can I find God?” that prompts the
human being’s search for meaning is really a question of removing those veils that hide the true
nature of things.457
The mystery of He/not He begins in the Divine Self, and from there cascades down to every
level of existence, the most important of which (for our purposes) are the world (which for Ibn
Arabī is all that is not God) and human beings.458 As Chittick explains, the Divine Presence is the
“location” of where Allāh is found, or at least “where we can affirm that what we found is He.”459
This “location” includes the Divine Essence (dhāt) which is God in Himself, and the Divine Names
(asmā’) which are the relationships between the Essence and everything else other than He.460
Allāh, or the “all-comprehensive Name,” refers to the Essence, Attributes, and acts of God. The
Essence is God in Himself without relation to anything else, and as such is entirely unknowable to
anyone but God. Thus, God as an Essence is understood in contrast to God’s Attributes which are
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predicated on the relationships God has with the cosmos, such as being its Creator (al-Khāliq),
Maker (al-Bāri’), Shaper (al-Muṣawwir).461 Ibn ‘Arabī’s concept of this paradoxical relation
between the Divine Essence and the Attributes is explained by Chittick:
Inasmuch as God’s Essence is Independent of the worlds, the cosmos is Not He, but
inasmuch as God freely assumes relationships with the worlds through attributes…the
cosmos manifests He.462
If we examine any aspect of creation, God is of course independent of that thing due to His
transcendence. At the same time, each thing displays something of the Divine Attributes, so it is
said to be similar to God in some way. Ibn ‘Arabī identifies this contrast, and employs two
theological terms to explain the incomparability of the Divine Essence and the undeniable
similarity of the Attributes to creation. He states that the Divine Essence is incomparable (tanzīh)
to all things by virtue of its Oneness, whereas the Attributes, which are many, are displayed by
created things as well, and are in some way “similar” (tashbīh) to creation.463 These two ways of
conceptualizing God’s relationship with the cosmos are central to Ibn ‘Arabī’s thought, since
tanzīh and tashbīh also indicate He/Not He. When viewing the Essence as God’s incomparability,
we can say little about God besides negate all else from Him, yet the Essence is God “as He is in
Himself” before He revealed Himself to creation. Thus, ontologically, incomparability is the
ultimate reference point for God, since it denotes the very Essence of God in Himself, without
relation to any other thing.464 The Divine Attributes, however, are also necessary for human beings
to understand God, since God names Himself through them in the Qur’an and calls upon human
beings to call Him by them.465 The Divine Names and Attributes are reflected in all of the cosmos,
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since God’s Power, Mercy, Love, Justice, and Beauty can be seen in all that He has made, in
everything from natural marvels to the most miniscule creature in creation.466 For Ibn ‘Arabī,
because the Divine Names manifest in all of creation, the Divine Names are considered the primary
reference points from which knowledge about the cosmos can be gained.467 However, this also
means that in order to understand anything about God’s creation, we must also trace the Attributes
which they display back to their “ontological root,” which is God Himself.468 The existence of the
creature is ultimately derived from God’s Being, its strength is derived from God’s Power, and its
knowledge from God’s knowledge. This exercise can be repeated endlessly for each Name to
explain the Divine roots of all of creation, a task which would fill thousands of pages to properly
explain, which is one of the reasons why Chittick says that Ibn ‘Arabī’s Futūḥāt spans an
astonishing 17,000 pages, rather than a few hundred.469
Whereas the mutakallimūn stressed tanzīh or God’s incomparability, Ibn ‘Arabī argues for
a balanced approach to tanzīh and tashbīh, since he believes that neither can be used to
exhaustively describe God.470 For Ibn ‘Arabī, tanzīh and tashbīh correspond to the two broad
categories of Divine Attributes as identified by Muslim thinkers, namely Attributes of Mercy
(Raḥmah) and Wrath (Ghaḍab), or Bounty (Faḍl) and Justice (‘Adl), or Beauty (Jamāl) and
Majesty (Jalāl), or Gentleness (Luṭf) and Severity (Qahr).471 The Qur’ān and tradition associate
the Attributes of Beauty and Gentleness with God’s nearness to His creatures, and the Attributes
of Severity, Wrath, and Majesty with His distance from creatures.472 Ibn ‘Arabī writes that God
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can be understood of in terms of tanzīh inasmuch as God is inaccessible, but tashbīh because the
Qur’ān states that He is closer the human being than the jugular vein (50:16). Furthermore, he
explains that when the Qur’ān states that God created human beings with His own two Hands
(38:75), this means that God employed Attributes of tanzīh and tashbīh to bring “His own image
into existence,” which allows for God to be mysteriously both “present with His creatures and
absent from them” or Inward and Outward, Manifest and Nonmanifest at the same time.473 The
Verifier (muḥaqqiq) is able to perceive of God’s presence in all things, through his faculty of
imagination (khayāl), which is able to establish relationships and bridge gaps that reason cannot,
which allows him to see God in all things and focus on God’s nearness in addition to His
distance.474 By doing so, the Verifiers are able to see the relationship between God and the world
in full, without emphasizing either tanzīh (as the theologians and philosophers tended to do) or
tashbīh. The Verifiers are able to recognize the true nature of things through an “intuitive
integration of paradox,” or the actualization of Sahl al-Tustarī’s saying, “one knows God by the
Union of the contrary qualities which relate to Him.”475 The Verifiers are said to see with both the
“eye of imagination” and the “eye of reason,” which allows them to realize perfect knowledge
through the heart and attain a balance between reason (which affirms tanzīh) and unveiling (which
stresses tashbīh) in order to experience a full disclosure of the Divine. However, Ibn ‘Arabī does
note those scriptural foundations which seem to assert the precedence of the Attributes of Mercy
over those of Wrath, such as My Mercy embraces all things (7:156) or the ḥadīth qudsi, “My Mercy
takes precedence over My Wrath,” which indicate that Attributes which reflect Mercy are more
central to the human experience than the Attributes of Wrath.476
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The Attributes of God represent those qualities - what Nasr calls “principial modalities” from which “all qualities of Being and all modalities of knowledge derive.”477 Although God
transcends all qualities, He is not devoid of them, because the apparently paradoxical relationship
between the Divine Essence and Attributes for Ibn ‘Arabī is resolved somewhere in between
incomparability (tanzīh) and similarity (tashbīh), since God’s transcendence and his Qualities
which are mirrored in creation, reference God’s Essence.478 Ibn ‘Arabī conceives of the Names as
the “Divine possibilities immanent in the Universe,” or the means through which He manifests in
the Universe, in addition to the way in which He describes Himself in the Qur’an. The Names can
then be conceived of as paths which lead to God, and a means of ascending to the “unitive
knowledge of the Divine Reality.”479 As we explained above, the Divine Names are central to
dhikr and manifest in the spiritual life of Muslims as the object of contemplation, since they lead
to spiritual realization.480

Takhalluq bi Akhlāq Allāh: Qualifying Oneself Through the Attributes of God
Every Name of God has a loci of manifestation (maẓāhir) in the cosmos; some are hidden,
and others are apparent, which indicates that the universe as a whole manifests all the Names of
God, since every existent thing contains one or more of the Attributes of Being in various modes.481
The Divine Attributes also manifest in a relative sense in created things, although they apply to
only God in an absolute sense. The human being is considered unique in Ibn ‘Arabī’s doctrine
because all of the Divine Attributes can be actualized by the one who perfects his faith and affirms
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tawḥīd in his innermost being. Ibn ‘Arabī’s ontological scheme conceives of the human being as
the microcosm, since human beings display within themselves the entire set of Divine Attributes
which are attributed to the cosmos (which is conceived of as the macrocosm).482 Human beings
are also unique in that they are created from two materials which are at opposite poles in the
hierarchy of existence, namely God’s spirit which was breathed into the dense clay of this world.483
Being created from the “most intense light of existence” and the dullest “dust of the universe”
allows for human beings to contain a luminous spiritual dimension within their being that is
contrasted with the other dark and dense nature pole of human being.484 The human soul ultimately
acts as the intermediary between the luminous and dark aspects of human existence, since it is
considered “the locus of our individual awareness.”485 The human spirit, by virtue of its relation
to God’s spirit, is able to recognize God, whereas the clay is dense and unable to perceive of Divine
Light. The human soul, which matures as a human being becomes more aware of the world through
“a never-ending process of self-discovery and self-finding,” may be able to attain harmony with
the spirit. The soul or human “self-awareness” can be spoken of in terms of light and dark, where
the most luminous souls rank at the very top of the hierarchy, and other souls, which lack selfawareness, rank at the very bottom of the hierarchy.486
The soul thus contains unlimited possibilities for development through a heightened
awareness of its own dual nature and the dualities present in the nature of all of existence. Ibn
‘Arabī’s ruminations on the potentiality of the soul echoes the tradition attributed to the Prophet
which states, “he who knows himself (nafsahu) knows his Lord.”487 Knowing the human soul in
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its entirety requires human beings to understand that every Attribute of God has been placed in the
human soul, because God created Adam “upon His own form” or His own “image.”488 Ibn ‘Arabī
takes this to mean that whereas the Divine Names and Attributes are scattered in the cosmos, they
are gathered and concentrated in human beings, such that the human being serves as the locus of
manifestation for the entire set of Divine Attributes.489 The growth of the human soul is
characterized by a movement from darkness to light, and the gradual acquisition of Divine
Attributes, since the soul is light and dark, and also contains every Name of God.490 As the human
soul strives towards self-discovery it matures and gains more knowledge of itself, which in turn
allows it to know God. For Ibn ‘Arabī, the stages and stations of the mystical path can then be seen
as stages in the process of actualizing various Divine Names, and striving towards human
perfection. As we saw above in the writings of Ibn ʿAṭā Allāh al-Iskandarī, acquiring the theurgic
power of certain Names through repeated invocation leads to the Ṣūfī goals of love and knowledge.
Because the human being is able to actualize the Divine Names, the human soul contains an
immense potentiality for spiritual growth, but due to its dual nature, the soul has a capacity for
deviation and moral degradation.491
Whereas human beings can appear outwardly human on this earth, inwardly it is possible for
them to transcend themselves or lower their status to that of animals. The return of all things to
God is a central theme in the Qur’an, which constantly reminds human beings that they will return
to God after all of their toils and trials in this world. Although most things are said to return in the
same form in which they were created, the human being is able to return to God in a markedly
changed spiritual state; whether that changed state is good or bad depends on the ability of each
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human being’s ability to actualize their “human” potential. Human beings, by virtue of their nature,
are also able to return to God in this world by following the Prophetic example and the path laid
down in the traditions and in scripture. The return can be what Ibn ‘Arabī calls “compulsory return”
(rujūʿ iḍṭirārī) which is the route all created things will take, regardless of their will.492 The Qur’ān
reminds us about this truth when God says, O Man, you are laboring towards your Lord
laboriously, and you shall encounter Him! (84:6).
Chittick explains that the other paths human beings can take, such as following the path of
their own caprice or greed, also take them back to God, but leads to his or her encounter with one
of the many Faces of God, the meeting with which may not be pleasant.493 The Divine Names also
give us an idea of what these Faces are like, since they give us insight into the “Divine roots of all
things.”494 Each Name is therefore considered a Face of God, or a specific Self-Disclosure that
appears to each human being based on the state of his or her own soul. Because human beings are
able to choose their route of return, by virtue of being created in God’s form, they are able to
actualize their humanity through realizing the Divine forms latent in their being. Where human
beings, in a sense, enter the world as fledgling souls containing an infinite potentiality with them,
they can actualize the Divine forms within their being and soar to stand before the Divine presence,
or they can leave the world without having developed any of these possibilities, and without having
acquired the virtues associated with the luminous aspect of the soul. To give another example using
the theme of light, Chittick explains that human beings begin as empty shells or as dim apparitions
which appear on the farthest of walls, which are separated by Absolute Light by the most massive
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chasm, what appears to be an “endless void.”495 The task assigned to human beings is to connect
the apparition to the Light it manifests, a process which requires an intensification of light in order
to overcome the surrounding darkness.496 According to this model, the human body, which is the
apparition, “remains a fixed reality until death” but the human consciousness is able to travel
towards the Light.497 The extent to which the human being strives toward the Absolute Light
reflects their waystation on the spiritual path. Some are satisfied in simply gazing at the dim
apparitions, others seek out varying intensities of the Light, whereas a group of select others, most
notably the Ṣūfīs, can only be satisfied with gazing at the Absolute Light alone.498
The Qur’ānic prayer, Guide us on the straight path (1:5), can be thought of as a call to
ascend the path and the varying degrees of light, but also as expressing a desire to increase one’s
actualization of the various Divine Attributes such as Life, Knowledge, Power, Generosity,
Patience, and so on.499 When human beings desire to increase these qualities in their own souls,
they begin the process of actualizing the Divine forms latent in the primordial nature of human
beings. Ibn ‘Arabī calls this process takhalluq or “assuming the traits,” which is related to the word
khuluq or “character trait.”500 The term khuluq has scriptural roots, since in the Qur’ān, God tells
the Prophet that he has a khuluq ‘aẓīm “sublime morals,” or “exalted character.”501 The word
khuluq is also related to the word for creation (khalq) which for Ibn ‘Arabī is indicative of the fact
that what the Qur’ān is referring to is not only the Prophet’s moral character but also his ability to
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realize the “potentialities of his primordial nature.”502 By actualizing the Qualities of Beauty such
as kindness, patience, benevolence, gratitude, and piety, the Prophet was able to actualize the
Divine Attributes that reside within the depths of the human soul, and thus “participate in the
fullness of human existence” in order to display the qualities of Being.503 The practice of acquiring
these character traits is an important part of the Islamic tradition, as many Prophetic traditions
mention cultivating morals, and shaping one’s character through the acquisition of virtues. When
the Prophet was asked, “which part of faith is most excellent?” He replied with, “A beautiful
character.”504 Other aḥadīth which relate to this one include: “The most perfect of the faithful in
faith is the most beautiful of them in character”; “The best thing in the Scale on the Day of
Judgement will be a beautiful character”; “The Prophet used to command people to observe noble
character traits”; and “I was sent to complete the beautiful character traits.”505 For Ibn ‘Arabī, the
connection between these noble character traits and the Divine Names of Beauty is that the moral
traits the Prophet was referring to are Divine Attributes such as Love, Compassion, Kindness,
Mercy, Faith, Generosity, Patience, and Wisdom.506
The Prophetic command for human beings to observe these traits, in the view of Ibn ‘Arabī,
is to call on human beings to qualify themselves through the Attributes of God, or in other words,
‘assume’ the character traits of God (takhalluq bi akhlāq Allah) which are identical to the Names
of God.507 Here Ibn ‘Arabī expounds in detail the central Ṣūfī doctrine of qualifying oneself
through the Attributes of God. Al-Junayd defined mystical love as a state where “the qualities of
the Beloved replace the qualities of the lover,” meaning that the union which the Ṣūfīs of his time
502
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spoke of so passionately was a transformation of the lover or seeker, “on the level of attributes.”508
Al-Ghazālī writes that the goal of the Ṣūfī path is to actualize one’s inner ta’alluh or “being like
unto Allāh” which can also be called “deiformity” or “theomorphism.”509 Thus, the goal of union
for the Ṣūfīs is really actualizing these Divine potentialities within oneself and recognizing the
human connection to the Creator. It is essential to mention here that Ṣūfī masters like Ibn ‘Arabī
and al-Junayd are not talking about takhalluq or “assuming” the character traits of Majesty or
Divine distance, since doing so is likened to claiming divinity for oneself, which is an
unforgiveable sin.510 The Divine traits of Majesty reveal the distance between human beings and
God, so human beings cannot even begin to gain proximity to them or even aspire to assume
them.511

Al-Insān al-Kāmil: The Perfect Man and the Prophetic Paradigm
The human being who is able to manifest all of the Divine Attributes serves as an
exemplary disclosure of the possibilities of the “human theomorphic state,” in that he serves as a
model of human perfection.512 Ibn ‘Arabī calls such a person who achieves such realization, “the
Perfect Human Being” (al-insān al-kāmil), which is one of his most famous doctrines.513 For Ibn
‘Arabī, only the Perfect Human Being can see things as they really are, and bear witness to the
relationships between the things that permeate existence.514 The Perfect Human Being, as the “total
theophany” (tajallī) of the Divine Names, serves as the “prototype of the universe” and also as
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“the prototype of man” in that he contains “within himself all of the possibilities found in the
Universe.”515 The Perfect Human Being also serves as the model of the spiritual life in that he has
realized all of the possibilities, and all of the states of being “inherent within the human state and
has come to know, in all its fullness, what it means to be a man.”516 The Perfect Human Being is
then first and foremost exemplified through the prophets, especially in the figure of the Prophet
Muḥammad, and then through the great saints, especially those who were said to be the “poles” or
Qutb of their age. Prophets and saints appear outwardly like all other human beings, but their inner
reality or inward nature reflects the possibilities inherent in the human soul. The Prophet has often
been called the first Ṣūfī, and Ibn ‘Arabī places him at the very center of his doctrine of the Perfect
Human Being, since following the Prophetic example in its entirety allows human beings to
actualize the Divine character traits denoted by the Names.
The Perfect Human Being’s vision combines the two lenses through which to view the
universe, man, and also God, namely those of tanzīh and tashbīh or incomparability and
similarity.517 The first lens through which Perfect Human Being views reality is through the
rational faculty, which declares God’s Unity (tawḥīd) and is able to affirm God’s Oneness through
the cosmos. The second lens is that of imagination which is able to help him transcend the
boundaries of reason to perceive God’s Self-Disclosure or theophany in all of existence.518
Whereas the limits of reason allow human beings to only get so far as to affirm God’s similarity
with the aid of revelation, imagination allows the Perfect Human Being to grasp that everything
reflects something of the doctrine of He/not He. Imagination (khayāl) allows human beings to
grasp that God’s Self-Disclosure can never be “known with precision” since this Disclosure
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includes the unknowable Essence. Although reason desires to understand the exact relationships
present in existence in terms of either/or, Perfect man is able to see the nature of relationships
clearly and knows that “all things are neither/nor, both/and, but never either/or.”519 The Perfect
Human Being is able to open up the imagination due to his spiritual realization and attain the total
vision of God’s Self-Disclosure, where he is unable to know “how” God discloses Himself but
where he “sees Him doing so.”520 An encounter with the Divine Self-Disclosure opens the heart
of the Perfect Human Being towards “infinite wisdom” which allows him to see the created order
for what it really is.521
Human perfection means manifesting God’s Names in their wholeness, such that the
Perfect Human Being is the “fullest outward expression” of Being Itself.522 The Perfect Human
Being alone is able to actualize all of the Divine character traits, or Qualities of Being through the
actualization of theomorphism. The human individual who displays all of the Divine Names and
Qualities is the expression of God’s Self-Disclosure such that the “Name Allāh shines forth in him
in infinite splendor.”523 Through affirming the Divine Attributes, the Perfect Human Being (the
microcosm) becomes identical with the cosmos (the macrocosm) which become two mirrors
reflecting one another. Yet it is only in the Perfect Human Being that all things are brought together
through the Perfect Human Being’s status as the “all comprehensive engendered thing” (al-kawn
al-jāmi‘) where all Divine Attributes are concentrated in a single place.524
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V. The Divine Names: Human Beings, the World, and God
Ibn ‘Arabī’s doctrine of the Divine Names offers a path for human perfection from which
the true human nature can be realized. What is unique about his approach to the Divine Names is
that these Qualities tell us a great deal about ourselves and also help us come to know God.
Sustained reflection on these Qualities allows the worshipper to not only learn more about the
object of desire but also the very character traits the Prophet called on human beings to acquire.
Thus, anything which can be said to be good or beautiful of our character traits is only because
these are derived from God’s Beautiful character traits. As I mentioned at the start of this section,
Ibn ‘Arabī was called the “expositor par excellence of gnosis” because he was able to explain the
inner dimension of Islam in such detail and explain how human perfection leads to a meeting with
God in this world. Whereas he begins with trying to find God, he ultimately ends with the human
being, the knowledge of which is essential to gaining any knowledge about the Creator, since “he
who knows himself knows his Lord.” Yet, this knowledge or the word used to describe it (‘arafa)
in this Prophetic tradition means something more like recognition rather than gaining some sort of
new information. The knowledge that arises from knowing oneself is thus simply renewed
knowledge of what “one already knows in one’s innermost being.”525 This re-cognition is central
to Sufism as ma’rifah and ‘irfān, which are other names for Sufism, also represent this theme of
recognition, which is at once self-recognition and simultaneously God’s recognition.526Adam was
taught all of the Names, but he forgot (20:115) and thus God had to repeatedly send reminders to
human beings to remind them of what they had forgotten, which was a knowledge that was central
to their very being itself.527 Remembrance of God through these Names allows human beings to
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actualize those character traits which are essential to their primordial nature, and which must
become manifest in order to bring about human perfection and wholeness.528
Recovering the fiṭrah or the primordial nature and achieving “deiformity” allows for
human beings to become fully human by realizing “the meaning of tawḥīd in the depths of the
human heart.”529 As Chittick explains, the Ṣūfī path can be summed up as a path where “each
human being is called to recognize Hidden Treasure, to recollect the names taught to Adam, to
love the true Beloved, and to be embraced by the true Lover.”530 The first step, recognizing the
Hidden Treasure is based upon the ḥadīth qudsi which states “I was a hidden treasure, and I loved
to be recognized; so I created the creatures so that I would be recognized.”531 This Divine saying
shows that God created the world to be known, which is why he gave human beings the ability to
recognize Him in every facet of existence. Human recognition of the Hidden Treasure engenders
love, which allows human beings to act as the Self-Disclosures of the Most Beautiful Names. As
Ṣadr al-Dīn al-Qūnawī (1209 –1274 CE), one of Ibn ‘Arabī’s students explains, the human soul,
by virtue of being taught all the Names by God is “God’s revealed book” because God states, We
shall show them Our signs upon the horizons and within themselves till it becomes clear to them
that it is the truth (41:53). Al-Qūnawī claims that this verse indicates that for human beings,
knowledge of their own souls is “knowledge of the Book.”532 Signs and traces of the Divine Names
and Attributes permeate the universe, which is a theatre of Divine Self-Disclosure. Those who are
able to see the manifestation of God in these signs by seeing them as signs of the Real are able to
recognize the cosmos for what it really is. In his Kitab al-Ḥikam, Ibn ʿAṭā Allāh writes, “The Real
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is not veiled from you. Rather, it is you who are veiled from seeing It.”533 Once the veils of
ignorance are lifted, and the Truth becomes apparent, the human being contemplates Him in
everything.534 Contemplation upon the signs of God which penetrate every aspect of the universe,
the human soul, and revelation leads human beings to recognize that everything in the universe is
a Self-Disclosure of the Divine. The relationships between human beings and the cosmos, the
cosmos and God, and God to all of creation attest to the Oneness of God and His total SelfDisclosure as both Majesty and Beauty, Distant and Near, and Inward and Outward. Only when
creatures affirm God’s revelation as both He and Not He can they truly affirm tawḥīd and display
the Divine Mystery on their own theatre of existence.

533

Ibn ʿAṭā Allāh Al-Iskandarī. Ṣūfī Aphorisms (Kitab al-Hikam). Translated by Victor Danner, Leiden: Brill, 1973,

29.
534

Al-Iskandarī. Ṣūfī Aphorisms (Kitab al-Hikam), 47.

108

afterword
Schimmel explains that the central mystery of Islam is tawḥīd, or affirming that God is
One, which Muslims can interiorize through an experience of God’s Oneness.535 In the Islamic
view, attesting to God’s Oneness is the goal of all human beings, since the Qur’an, and in fact all
of sacred history, is a reminder that there is no god but God. This message permeates all of
existence, and all created things are called upon to glorify the Creator. Nasr calls the shahādah the
“supreme statement of both Divine Unity and Transcendence,” since it teaches human beings about
God Oneness through negation and affirmation.536 When Muslims repeat the testimony of faith,
they affirm God’s Transcendence by negating all else from Him. With the shahādah as a
framework, one can take this negation a step further, and say that there is no knowledge but God’s
Knowledge, no mercy but God’s Mercy, no beauty but the Divine Beauty, no power but the Divine
power, and so on.537 This exercise can be repeated with every Divine Name to endlessly negate all
else from God, and affirm that nothing in the universe shares in God’s Unity, since everything can
only be conceived of in relation to Him.
Thus, the Divine Names serve as ways to know God and return to Him.538 When God calls
upon readers of the Qur’an to enumerate His Names, the practice of doing so allows Muslims to
continually affirm His Oneness (tawḥīd) and to understand their relationship to the Divine.
Therefore, where we begin with many Divine Names, we ultimately are led back, as is the case
with all things, to the One. By affirming that God is One, human beings interiorize the Divine
Mystery and come to learn their role in the grand theatre of the universe. If it seems as though God
has Attributes which seem similar to the created order, the Ṣūfīs would say that human beings
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really reflect Divine Attributes which are central to their existence, by virtue of being created in
God’s form (sūrah). Thus, all Attributes, whether they indicate incomparability or similarity, only
attest to God’s Absolute Oneness and Transcendence. Only God displays these Character Traits
absolutely; human beings can only ever display the Attributes in a limited sense.
Examining the Divine Names allows human beings to know God in terms of His similarity
and His incomparability, and also enables them to reflect on those character traits which are
essential to being fully human. Thus, knowledge of ourselves, and our inner being, which contains
the entire set of Divine Attributes is a prerequisite for gaining any knowledge of God. By
actualizing those character traits which are the roots of all that exists, human beings are able to
recognize the meaning of Divine Oneness in the depths of their hearts. Once they affirm God’s
Oneness in their being, human beings are able to recognize God’s total Self-Disclosure as both
Near and Far, Inward and Outward, Beauty and Majesty.
Although the ways of revelation and reason only allow human beings to come to
understand God in terms of His dissimilarity from the created order, the way of experience allows
human beings to understand God in terms of both registers He uses to describe Himself, tanzīh and
tashbīh. Throughout their lives, human beings experience God as Immanent and Transcendent,
Manifest and Hidden. Their experiences of the One God constantly oscillate between these two
states. In order to know God, human beings must transcend paradox and synthesize their opposing
experiences of the Divine. In our survey of the approaches to the Divine Names and Attributes,
only a few thinkers were able to explain how these opposing views fit together, and offer some of
the most profound insights on what the Divine Names and Attributes tell us about God, the world,
and most surprisingly, ourselves. Even though the earliest theologians began to allude to the Divine
Mystery, Ibn ‘Arabī was able to transform the Ashʿarī doctrine of a paradoxical view of the Divine
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Names and Attributes in relation to the Divine Essence into an intricate metaphysical doctrine.
Whereas al-Ashʿarī recognized that we can understand God in terms of paradox, and that it is
possible that God’s Attributes can be neither identical to, nor other than the Divine Essence, Ibn
‘Arabī was able to explain what this paradox tells us about the nature of the created order.
The call to characterize oneself by the Attributes of God insofar as humanly possible is one
of the most interesting findings we come across when researching the Divine Names. This doctrine
goes beyond mere theory and offers a practice, a way of spiritual realization and a method of
transcending our limited understanding of God, the world, and ourselves. Not only is this idea
rooted in the Prophetic tradition of cultivating beautiful virtues, but this doctrine features across
the Abrahamic faiths. For Maimonides (1138–1204), the influential Jewish philosopher and Torah
scholar, knowledge of God comes directly from knowledge of His Attributes, which in turn allows
us to gain knowledge of His Acts. Through knowledge of God’s acts, human beings learn that their
chief purpose is to “make their acts similar to the acts of God,” a call that is reflected in scriptural
verses which say, “You shall be holy, for I the Lord your God am holy” (Lev. 19:2), and “He is
gracious, so be you also gracious; He is merciful, so be you also merciful” (Talmud. 1:54).539 In
this view, the Divine Qualities of Mercy, Grace, and even Holiness call for reflection, and more
importantly, actualization.
Acquiring these characteristics is quite difficult, since human beings display their own
juxtaposition of qualities that bar them from recognizing their own share in the Divine Qualities.
The human being is composed of God’s Spirit, which is an intense light, and dense and dark clay,
and actualizing one’s human potential requires one to see the light which is at the center of one’s
being, and see through the dark clay that prevents them from seeing that the Divine is already
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present. Those human beings who are able to uncover the luminous part of their soul, are able to
transcend their own ignorance of the nature of things, and fix themselves on the Divine Light.
They are also able to recognize the part of the Divine Light which resides in their own being. This
journey towards knowledge of ourselves is inward and outward, composed of finding and notfinding, affirmation and negation. These contradictions, or rather paradoxes, are an unshakable
fact of the created order. Human beings spend their entire lifetimes finding God, all the while
cultivating an understanding of the dualities present in their very own souls. Reason and logic
constrain our understanding of the world, God, and ourselves, whereas our faculty of imagination
allows us to recognize the paradoxes of creation and integrate opposites – Yes and No, He and Not
He. The very structures which are present in every created thing are constantly in opposition. Yet,
human beings are called upon to recognize the One amongst the multiplicity, and find Him even
when the world or reason may bar them from knowledge of Him.
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